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ABSTRACT
This paper explores four Wildean texts, their techniques, and their purposes,
beginning with an introduction to Wilde’s life, contemporary culture, and his major
educational and ideological influences—a familiarity that is necessary to understand his
more subtle and subversive meanings. The second chapter deals with Wilde’s preincarceration texts, “The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of Dorian Gray. The essay
serves almost as a guidebook for the writing of the novel and through similarities in
theme and vocabulary, perfectly sets up a comparison with the post-incarceration
works—De Profundis and The Ballad of Reading Gaol—which will be examined in the
third chapter, along with various biographical elements which are necessary to any
interpretation of De Profundis.
Echoing the relationship between “The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of
Dorian Gray, De Profundis serves as an interpretive tool for The Ballad of Reading Gaol.
In Reading Gaol Wilde expounds in great detail upon his theory about Christ, who is one
of the three primary figures in the poem (the other two being Charles Thomas
Wooldridge and, of course, Wilde himself). The object of this treatment is not to
demonstrate some great transformation in Wilde’s proclaimed philosophy of life and art,
but rather to display the “deepening” of a man who, by discovering that “the secret of life
is suffering” (De Profundis 1082), realized a hope declared in a confiscated letter passed
through prison bars: “Perhaps there may come into my art also, no less than into my life,
a still deeper note, one of greater unity of passion, and directness of impulse” (1098).
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Oscar Wilde dedicated himself to the belief that knowledge and truth were the
direct result of personal experience. Wilde’s own personal experience was largely one
of pleasure. As a privileged member of the upper-middle class with an Oxford education,
Wilde seems to have had little if any personal interaction with the harsher realities of
society. Financially secure for the first forty years of his life first through his parents and
then through his wife, Wilde never experienced until later the unpleasant realities of
survival faced by so many of his less-fortunate contemporaries. But Wilde’s trial and
incarceration at the age of forty broadened both his experience and perspective. This
broadening can be seen through an examination of “The Decay of Lying” and The
Picture of Dorian Grey, two of Wilde’s pre-incarceration works, and compares their
rhetorical technique with the only two major works published after his release from
prison—The Ballad of Reading Gaol and De Profundis. A close analysis of these texts
will, I believe, reveal some of the most significant changes wrought in Wilde the man and
author by his experiences in Reading Gaol.
Before his incarceration, Oscar Wilde masked what he believed to be true with
several layers of often very controversial rhetoric. Wilde’s use of outrageous expressions
to voice subversive opinions accomplished his immediate goal: to say what it was that he
wanted to say in such a way that those who would disagree would dismiss his “ravings”
as witty, if slightly discomforting, banter while allowing those who would agree with him
to enjoy a little joke at society’s expense. Wilde was able to speak what he believed to be

true without publicly coming out of the intellectual closet, as it were. He kept his
audience guessing about what he actually thought. This was the perfect strategy for a man
who wanted his audience in particular, and society in general, to question the legitimacy
of the opinions and beliefs accepted as de facto. As long as he addressed the larger
questions of society—i.e., what is morality, what is the obligation of the individual to
society, etc., this abstruse form of communication was in Wilde’s best interest.
Through this subversive form of interaction with Victorian society Wilde came to
see art as a form of non-violent crime and the artist as a type of social criminal. By
paralleling the worlds of art and crime, Wilde constructed the perfect stage for the
presentation of his ideas on fiction, morality, and experience. Unfortunately, a significant
portion of Wilde’s readers did not perceive his carefully constructed mask of words, and
because of this Wilde’s writings eventually contributed to his conviction and
incarceration. In Wilde’s libel suit against the Marquess of Queensberry, his book The
Picture of Dorian Gray was brought out as a key character witness for the defense. The
Marquess’s successful presentation of Dorian Gray as an immoral book, including the
implication that aspects of the novel were autobiographical rendered the author immoral
in the public eye. Wilde lost his suit against Queensberry only to be charged with gross
misconduct, during the prosecution of which his public writings were again used as
evidence of his private life. With that fictional “proof “ in the hands of a society which
could not see the true goal of his writings, Wilde was ostracized and imprisoned.
As an already thoughtful author, Wilde endured a prison sentence that didn’t
change his aesthetic ideology, but it did narrow his focus and compel him to hone his
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definitions. While Wilde claimed to have never forsaken his philosophy of art as the
fashioning of a beautiful thing solely for the artist’s personal pleasure, his work following
his release was in a style that functioned very differently from anything he had done
before. His first publication after prison was his poem The Ballad of Reading Gaol, in
which Wilde forsook his usual rhetoric of the outrageous, ambiguous, and farcical for a
language of religion, sincerity, and rebuke. It is not that he had suddenly “got religion”—
on the contrary, it seems that the conditions and events he witnessed in prison only
reinforced his conviction that the so-called morals and values of Victorian England
amounted to nothing more than a social contract of hypocrisy. However, the immediacy
and glaring reality of the suffering that Wilde witnessed seems to have wrought in him an
unpremeditated change in tactics. Instead of writing a scathing, out-and-out criticism of
the society that had no compunctions when it came to the treatment of criminals and the
less fortunate, Wilde chose to adopt language and a tone that would meet Victorians
where they lived and asked them to act based on what they already claimed to believe as
Christians.
This is not to imply that Wilde abandoned his previously employed method of
saying two different things at once—a private meaning is certainly preserved in the poem
along with the surface one. Indeed, The Ballad of Reading Gaol reflects a Christology
unique to Wilde, but subtle enough to be mistaken for orthodoxy by uninitiated readers.
The primary difference between The Ballad of Reading Gaol and Wilde’s preincarceration writings is the sense of urgency, of “being there.” The author is more
present in the ballad than in the distant social criticism of Lady Windermere’s Fan
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(1892), and more sincere in his account of prison than in the fictitious philosophical
questioning in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Wilde’s works were beautiful in the his own
eyes—a realization which is, according to Wilde, the very essence of artistic creation—
and the themes they included reflected the observations and preoccupations of the
playwright more than a premeditated agenda.
De Profundis, a letter written during his incarceration, includes Wilde’s stated
intention of trying to change the prison system that he called “absolutely and entirely
wrong” (De Profundis 1097). And The Ballad of Reading Gaol is Wilde’s analysis of the
consequences of Victorian society’s ideology and the incarnation of his ideal of the
sympathetic imagination. Wilde once remarked of his contemporary Wilfred Scawen
Blunt: “It must be admitted that by sending Mr Blunt to gaol he [Mr Balfour] has
converted him from a clever rhymer into an earnest and deep-thinking poet” (qtd. in Kohl
290). It seems that a similar experience was the catalyst behind the evolution of Wilde’s
personal philosophy of life and, to use his word, the “deep[ening]” of his person and
imagination that is revealed through Reading Gaol (De Profundis 1097).
That deepening did not mean that Wilde felt obliged to lift the Gnostic veil that
obscured his personal convictions; the veil is just as present in The Ballad of Reading
Gaol as it is in The Picture of Dorian Gray. The difference between the two is the modus
operandi: Wilde’s novel is easily misunderstood, seeming with every lesson to encourage
ideas contrary to the nominal morals of Victorian society. In fact, Dorian Gray
exemplifies Wilde’s definition of art in “The Decay of Lying” and reveals him to be an
accomplished “liar.” The characters of the novel are exaggerated, the events sometimes
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fantastical, and the style idiosyncratic. However, these techniques are left by the wayside
after his prison term provided Wilde with ample experience and time to contemplate the
effects of sorrow upon the imagination and of suffering upon the soul. The “lies” the
artist tells cease to be merely for the sake of entertaining invention or ambiguous
criticism.
Rather than using the playful and sometimes provocative tone of his earlier work,
in The Ballad of Reading Gaol Wilde sets a pensive and at times reproachful mood. The
truth is no longer told through an inaccessible mask. This time, between the audience and
Wilde, both the mask and the meaning behind it are true and equally efficacious. Wilde’s
objective shifts from posing philosophical questions about art and morality to directly
confronting a geographically and morally specific situation for which, through his poem,
he demands both recognition and a solution. In reference to The Picture of Dorian Gray,
he declared: “I wrote this book entirely for my own pleasure. . . .Whether it becomes
popular or not is a matter of absolute indifference to me” (“Defense of Dorian Gray”
238). De Profundis records Wilde’s new motivation: “Society takes upon itself the right
to inflict appalling punishments on the individual, but it also has the supreme vice of
shallowness, and fails to realize what it has done” (1078). The Ballad of Reading Gaol is
Oscar Wilde’s only (explicitly) artistic communiqué to society after serving his two-year
sentence, and, as a call to reform, it is effortlessly accessible.
The following chapters will explore these texts, their techniques, and their
purposes in greater detail, beginning with an introduction to Wilde’s life, contemporary
culture, and his major educational and ideological influences—a familiarity that is
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necessary to understand his more subtle and subversive meanings. The second chapter
will deal with Wilde’s pre-incarceration texts, “The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of
Dorian Gray. The essay serves almost as a guidebook for the writing of the novel and
through similarities in theme and vocabulary, perfectly sets up a comparison with the
post-incarceration works—De Profundis and The Ballad of Reading Gaol—which will be
examined in the third chapter, along with various biographical elements which are
necessary to any interpretation of De Profundis.
Echoing the relationship between “The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of
Dorian Gray, De Profundis serves as an interpretive tool for The Ballad of Reading Gaol.
In Reading Gaol Wilde expounds in great detail upon his theory about Christ, who is one
of the three primary figures in the poem (the other two being Charles Thomas
Wooldridge and, of course, Wilde himself). The object of this treatment is not to
demonstrate some great transformation in Wilde’s proclaimed philosophy of life and art,
but rather to display the “deepening” of a man who, by discovering that “the secret of life
is suffering” (De Profundis 1082), realized a hope declared in a confiscated letter passed
through prison bars: “Perhaps there may come into my art also, no less than into my life,
a still deeper note, one of greater unity of passion, and directness of impulse” (1098).
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CHAPTER TWO
A NEW AESTHETIC: FROM MORALITY TO CRIMINALITY
For those familiar with the works of Oscar Wilde, his cultural and biographical
context may come as a surprise. Born October 16, 1854 Wilde was a child of an era
known primarily for oppressive rules of morality and repressive concern for appearances.
The Victorian Age nevertheless, or perhaps because of these circumstances, provided a
unique catalyst for change in artistic sensibilities. The early-to-mid-19th century
publications of Charles Darwin and D. F. Strauss challenged traditionally accepted views
on the origin and purpose of the world and the legitimacy of Christianity. As the structure
of knowledge built upon religion began to crumble under the weight of inquiry, art too
received a fresh examination. While philosophers dissected and codified the great
epistemological shift that was slowly gaining momentum, the artistic community sought
to represent similar lines of inquiry through creative innovation. The “moral aesthetic,” as
John Ruskin and Matthew Arnold phrased the idea that a work of art had a clear
responsibility to instruct society in traditional Christian morality, gave way to works that
reflected a more individualized and purely expressive aesthetic (qtd. in Buckley 10).
These works reflected the artists as individuals rather than as spokespersons for
moralism. Artists were calling the value of strictly mimetic art into question, and as the
authority behind Christian morality become more illusory, so did the definition of
“goodness” in general and “good art” in particular. Because the terms “criminal” and
“immoral” were almost interchangeable in the middle-class Victorian vocabulary, Wilde
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would eventually find that the questions surrounding moral goodness and moral art were
best explored through the metaphor of laws and criminals.
Wilde’s own art and aesthetic theories were built upon, and sometimes a reaction
against, the aesthetic theories of the men he studied under while he was a student at
Magdalen College, Oxford from 1874 to1878. There were two men in particular who
influenced Wilde’s sense of the moral and the aesthetic: John Ruskin and Walter Pater.
Wilde encountered John Ruskin, then Slade Professor of Fine Art, quite early in his
university career. Ruskin’s convictions about art and morality are reflected in Ruskin’s
1864 essay “Traffic”: “Taste…is not only a part and an index of morality; —it is the only
morality. The first, and last, and closest trial question to any living creature is, ‘What do
you like?’ Tell me what you like, and I’ll tell you what you are” (qtd. in Buckley vii).
Ellmann records that Ruskin, having abandoned evangelicalism, adhered to the belief that
the morality of an artist could be shown through “fidelity to nature, and by eschewing
self-indulgent sensuality” (Oscar Wilde 48). Ruskin found truth and beauty in the lines of
nature, and his lectures often included defenses of Turner’s landscapes, tirades against
modernity, and dim prognostications on the mechanization of humanity. His observations
went beyond the realm of art and addressed society as a whole. As his 1851-1853 series
The Stones of Venice reveals, Ruskin was convinced that the lower-class workers of
society must be given something to think about, as well as something to do. Also inherent
in Ruskin’s philosophy was the idea that to demand perfection of a society or an
individual was to decry humanity itself.
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Walter Pater was, besides Ruskin, the scholar Oscar Wilde was most eager to
meet when he arrived at Oxford. Their meeting did not take place until Wilde’s third
year, but reading Pater’s Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873) during his first
term made Wilde aware of the great differences between his two idols. Pater had studied
under both John Ruskin and Oxford professor of poetry Matthew Arnold. Although most
modern scholars consider Arnold a great Victorian moralist, he was in fact campaigning
in both his writings and his classrooms for a more aesthetic philosophy of art. Concerned
by the effects of rigid religious ideas on realms of art and thought, Arnold examined the
origin of his contemporary standard of morality as part of a plea for intellectual integrity.
In his opinion, society’s recalcitrant attitude towards changes in standards of morality and
art is the direct result of a religiously misguided but stubbornly championed
understanding of human nature. Dealing with this question extensively in Culture and
Anarchy (1869), Arnold sought to answer the dilemma faced by men such as Pater and
Wilde, who found themselves trapped by the narrowly confined category of socially
acceptable and unacceptable behavior and expression. This moving away from the “moral
aesthetic” caused no small stir within a culture that Jerome Buckley describes as rampant
with “moral hypocrisy. . . deliberate sentimentalism. . . (and) social snobbery” (3).
Arnold identified the cause of his culture’s hypocrisy, describing society in terms of rules
and obedience:
. . .[T]hey have been led to regard in themselves, as the one thing needful,
strictness of conscience, the staunch adherence to some fixed law of doing we
have got already, instead of spontaneity of consciousness, which tends continually
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to enlarge our whole law of doing. They have fancied in themselves to have in
their religion a sufficient basis for the whole of their life fixed and certain forever,
a full law of conduct, and a full law of thought, so far as thought is needed. . . .
(Arnold 145-146)
While he adopted and perhaps even exaggerated Ruskin’s disinterest in the perfection of
society, Pater largely rejected the majority of Ruskin’s philosophy, finding in Arnold’s
gospel of intellectual liberation the impetus behind the formation of his own aesthetic.
Aside from channeling some of Arnold’s ideas, Walter Pater drew the attention of
his students, eventually including Wilde, to the relativity of truth and the transience of
human life. Pater believed that the quest for truth, like the quest for social perfection, was
pointless. He taught that the responsibility of each person was to fully experience and
enjoy the sensations of life, in particular those sensations inspired by works of art. His
portrayal of life as a highly individual experience driven by the quest for sensational
experience instead of illusory objective truths became a sort of epicurean gospel. For a
time, Oscar Wilde wholeheartedly embraced Pater’s philosophy of art for art’s sake, a
mantra both Pater and Wilde saw exemplified in the work of Dante Gabriel Rossetti
(1828-1882) who ignored matters of politics and society in his art, choosing instead to
concentrate his creative powers on the transcendent nature of Beauty itself. For Pater and
Wilde, this was to glory in art.
Although he would eventually transcend both Ruskin and Pater, Wilde’s
interaction with each man had a life-long effect on him. According to Richard Ellmann,
Wilde sought Pater for a philosophy of the senses, and Ruskin for the instruction of his

10

soul (Oscar Wilde 49). Wilde called Pater’s Studies in the History of the Renaissance:
“’my golden book’” (47), and in De Profundis Wilde called it “that book which has had
such a strange influence over my life” (1079). Ellmann references a letter Wilde wrote to
Ruskin, in which Wilde says: “. . .from you I learned nothing but what was good” (50).
Coming to ideological maturity in the midst of a split intellectual heritage, with the
morality of Ruskin on the one side, and the aestheticism of Pater and Rossetti on the
other, Wilde developed a theory of morality and aestheticism unique to himself. Wilde
claimed that it was this hedonistic challenge in Walter Pater’s Studies in the History of
the Renaissance that most influenced his philosophy:
A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life.
How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How
shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus
where the greatest number of vital forces unite in there purest energy. . . . To burn
always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.
(Beckson 289)
In later editions of his History, Pater removed the last sentence for fear of its
being taken too literally. Indeed, for Wilde the flame and the ecstasy took on a sensual
aspect that, for a time, eclipsed everything else in Pater’s theory. Wilde would eventually
come to recognize, as Buckley describes it, that Pater’s conception of “[g]reatness in
art…could, therefore, be attained only by a great personality, by an Epicurean of the
higher kind, having no commerce with the amoral hedonism of the Aesthete, capable
rather of seeing life in all its relations as a harmonious whole” (182). Far from valuing a
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non-moral life or art that cut the artist off from all social responsibility and involvement,
Pater simply had no interest “[i]n the ‘sordid’ or the brutal, the ‘realistic’ for its own sake.
. .it was art’s single function to heighten reality, to elevate, to provide, without direct
didactic intent, some final guide to conduct” (ibid). For Pater the new aesthetic served as
a moral muse, replacing the “fixed law of doing” with a new morality in which the only
standards were experience and beauty (Arnold 145). His vision for the world was not one
of amorality, but of a society where art championed ideas that could be realized and not
merely left on the canvas or page as ideals.
The realization of ideas through art became one of Wilde’s great inspirations,
although at first the challenge seems merely to have been to capture the idea through art,
rather than to see it understood and implemented. Perhaps the clearest example of this is
the way Wilde chose to deal with a society of “philistines”, as he liked to call them, after
the example of Matthew Arnold. After leaving Oxford in 1878, Wilde was more than
ever confronted with the unreceptive nature of the middle-class Victorian’s attitude
toward the new aesthetic and its prophets. Considering himself a great individualist,
Wilde was unwilling to long align himself with any particular group or creed. He was
also unwilling to conform to a society that seemed to prize conformity of behavior and
opinion above all else. These circumstances were complicated by the fact that, as a
writer, this same society was his primary audience. To alienate them was to consign
himself to obscurity. Instead of being discouraged by or frustrated with his environment,
Wilde found in his circumstances the opportunity to create perhaps his greatest work of
art: himself. His solution was a master-stroke of the subversive for which he is now

12

famous. He developed a personae that turned the acceptance of appearances to his own
advantage. When in company Wilde adopted a habit of speaking and behaving in a way
that built a castle of contradictions upon the quicksand of paradox. With one fell stroke,
Wilde preserved himself as an individualist, and became the incarnation of the artist as a
social criminal.
The advantage of setting himself up as a paradox was two-fold: first, the public’s
assumption that Wilde was an artist who spoke and wrote in exaggerated, sometimes
shocking terms was interpreted by his social peers as eccentric and entertaining and
therefore not entirely sincere. Thus Wilde was able to artistically express his ideas
without actually making a serious point that would require his audience to give
significant pause. For example, according to Regenia Gagnier, Wilde was once asked
what he thought about a psychologist’s theory that all persons of genius were insane. His
response—that all sane people must therefore be “idiots”—must have appeared to be
merely an off-the-cuff witticism (Idylls 152). For a long time this assumption sustained
Wilde’s status as an acceptable member of society’s guest list. The second (and personal)
advantage was Wilde’s freedom to express his mistrust and criticism of his company and
audience from a position of relative safety. When Wilde declared that he lived in constant
fear of “not being misunderstood,” he was alluding to this tenuous security (qtd. in
Holland 3). His position depended upon the narrow-minded members of his society not
understanding what he was truly saying. Had any of his company taken his “idiots”
comment seriously, they would have seen that Wilde’s response is not so much a
condemnation of the intellect of his “sane” contemporaries as it is an expression of his
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deep dissatisfaction with the pre-packaged knowledge and opinions of society. His
decrying sanity by aligning it with idiocy is a criticism of a society that behaves as
though it is comprised of idiots, a society that desperately tries to function as though there
are no questions to be asked of mankind and one’s experience.
The efficacy of this mask of foppish dismissal was especially important in light of
Wilde’s philosophy of mankind’s knowledge and experience. For Wilde true knowledge
was the result of experience and an individual’s sensory exploration was the most valid
form of knowledge. This seeking out of knowledge through the senses is gleaned from
Pater’s notion of happiness, as recorded and affirmed in Wilde’s diary entry of June 21,
1890: “the whole problem of life turns on pleasure—Pater shows that the hedonist—the
perfect hedonist—is the saint. ‘One is not always happy when one is good; but one is
always good when one is happy’”(Ellmann 306). This ideal, in Wilde’s interpretation,
translates into the equation of goodness with the pursuit of happiness. In his public life,
this pursuit of happiness and knowledge was manifested through his delight in his art and
his determination that he was obligated to please only himself. More than anything else,
Oscar Wilde was pleased to challenge the status quo, and much of his art was created to
fulfill that desire.
It was this individualistic disregard for popular opinion that eventually led to
Wilde’s identification of the artist with the criminal. Just as the criminal is one who flouts
laws prescribed by social contract, the artist transgresses against the social mores. Wilde
appropriated acts of crime for his fictional work (for example: The Picture of Dorian
Gray and “Lord Arthur Savile’s Crime”), turning the rebellion of the criminal against the
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law into a metaphor for the individual’s intellectual and moral rebellion against a “fixed
law of doing” (Arnold 145). Unfortunately, Wilde’s general readership could not see
beyond his choice of imagery and subject matter. It would be a mistake to assume, as a
large part of his audience assumed, that, because Wilde often wrote plots including
murder, corruption, and criminals, he was exalting those behaviors. Those elements were
useful to Wilde as he sought to pose a myriad of questions to his audience—questions he
struggled with himself as an artist who, while in Paris in 1883, aligned himself for a short
time with a group of artists and thinkers who called themselves Les Décadents. In his
book The Devil’s Advocates: Decadence in Modern Literature (1989), Thomas Whissen
describes artistic decadence as
simply another way of looking at the world, and like any other Weltanschauung, it
is, at bottom, a defense against dread (emphasis mine). . . .In a world hasty to
accept wrong answers but reluctant to ask the right questions, decadence insists
on raising those questions: Why are we here? Why do we bother? How do we
face the unknown—or the known, for that matter? (xv)
It seems natural, then, that an artist who would be attracted to Decadence would,
in defiance of the “fixed law of doing” (Arnold 145), set his sights on those aspects of life
that had always been seen as forbidden fruit: the secret, avoided, “immoral” categories.
This desperation to understand the side of human nature that had been so long vilified
was accompanied by a desire to explore the criminal side of society that came with it.
Upper- and middle-class Victorian society commonly held that there existed a line not
just in refinement, but in the moral nature of the social stratum separating them from the
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lower classes of East London. Wilde used his artistic abilities to subtly tear down the
studied distinction made between Victorian society’s upper and lower classes. His work
reveals a perceptive grasp of human nature as he strove to display the fact that the
difference between the upper and lower classes was not one of moral nature, but of the
situational environment in which the moral nature was formed and functioned. The
differences of education, temperament, and wealth are, in Wilde’s eyes, sufficient to
explain what is considered immoral in a wealthy man and criminal in a poor man. But by
dealing with the manifestations of “immorality” in the lower classes through his writing,
Wilde ran the risk of being labeled a sympathizer of all things immoral. Indeed, his very
position as an artist was all the upper-class public needed to start down that way of
thinking.
It fact, it seems that many Victorian readers had forgotten or suppressed the
legacy of the link between art and crime, first as a forensic appreciation of a violent crime
as an aesthetic scene and later as a recognition of the creativity inherent in a successful
criminal venture. In 1827, long before Wilde began his own treatment of the topic,
Thomas De Quincy had introduced a strange appreciation of the aesthetics of crime with
his lecture “On Murder as One of the Fine Arts.” De Quincy claimed to have found his
lecture accidentally, telling his audience that it was the secret publication of an
underground London group calling themselves “The Society for Connoisseurs of
Murder” (De Quincy 339). It is more likely that De Quincy wrote the lecture himself. The
lecture is an exercise in practiced irony, referring to murder as “an improper line of
conduct” (341) and proclaiming that before a murder is committed, it must be viewed
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morally, but once done it is subject to aesthetic critique: “Enough has been given to
morality; now comes the turn of Taste and the Fine Arts. . .as it is impossible to hammer
anything out of it for moral purposes, let us treat it aesthetically, and see if it will turn to
account that way” (344).
De Quincy had already separated aesthetic analysis from moral judgment, and one
wonders if Wilde had applied this view to human nature. If he believed what he said in
his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, that “it is the spectator, and not life, that art
really mirrors” (Dorian 3), then art is free to be as moral or immoral as humankind is
itself. Finding Victorian morality insufficient for the demand of his desires and indeed
incapable of living up to the morality it idolized, Wilde saw the deep flaw of imperfection
in the root of humankind and turned to aestheticism and decadence as the means of best
fulfilling De Quincy’s conviction that “even imperfection itself may have its ideal or
perfect state” (334). Why live in hypocritical denial of one’s own nature merely for the
approval of a broken society, especially when one so wholeheartedly embraces Pater’s
notion of success?
The connection between creativity in art and crime fascinated Wilde, and when he
wrote the essay “Pen, Pencil and Poison: A Study in Green” (1891) exploring the
interaction between art and crime he began by addressing Victorian society’s view of the
artistic nature: “It has constantly been made a subject of reproach against artists and men
of letters that they are lacking in wholeness and completeness of nature. As a rule this
must necessarily be so. . . To those who are preoccupied with the beauty of form nothing
else seems of much importance” (Essays 73). In other words, the nature of the artist is not
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so much incomplete as it is single-minded. Wilde’s defense centers not on the
qualifications of a work of art but on those of the artist, creating a definition of the artist
that could include personalities such as Thomas Griffiths Wainewright. The subject of
“Pen, Pencil and Poison,” Wainewright was born in 1794. Wilde describes him as a poet,
a painter, and a critic. A capable member of the art world, Wainewright was also an
infamous forger and uncommonly skilled with poisons. Ironically stating that the “fact of
a man being a poisoner is nothing against his prose” (97), Wilde’s point is that there “is
no essential incongruity between crime and culture. We cannot rewrite the whole of
history for the purpose of gratifying our moral sense of what should be” (98). A man’s
life must be taken as a whole, and the lives of artists must be considered honestly,
according to who they really were, not according to what society, determined to have
beautiful art originate in “good” men, would make them out to be. Wilde created a
parallel between those who transgressed against society physically or financially and
those who did so intellectually or creatively.
Careful to broaden the distinction between the two categories but convinced that a
metaphor of crime was the best vehicle for expressing how he viewed his own interaction
with society, Wilde built upon the foundation laid by those who had already made
connections, albeit more directly, between art and crime. Although a criminal separates
himself from the masses by a violent act, the artist harms no one. Society is not obligated
to a take part in the creations of the artist. In Wilde’s opinion, this autonomy is both the
motivation for and the end of art, as he observes in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism”
(1891):
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Crime, which, under certain conditions may seem to have created individualism,
must take cognizance of other people and interfere with them. . .But alone,
without any reference to his neighbors, without any interference, the artist can
fashion a beautiful thing; and if he does not do it solely for his own pleasure, he is
not an artist at all. (270)
While Art may be a crime against Victorian morality, morality is not an object or person
to be offended, and therefore the artist is not a true criminal because he does not disrupt
anyone or destroy property. So it is that the truest individualist is not the criminal but the
artist. His primary goal in creation is to please himself, and, without the complication of
interfering with the life of another, the question of the morality of the artwork is a purely
personal one.
It was this theory of art and the artist that prompted Wilde to bemoan the use of
art as a means of telling the truth. Aside from his staunch belief that half-truths were the
best truths available to mankind, a conviction he advertised with every paradoxical quip,
Wilde became convinced that aestheticism was not a creed to be embraced, but a problem
to be explored. This early transition in his philosophy of art effectively removed him
from the cause of art for art’s sake and established his mode of artistic expression for the
rest of his life. The Victorian and mimetic idea that the artist was to tell the truth through
art included at least two assumptions that were, for Wilde, unacceptable. The first was
simply the presumption that there was an objective truth to be represented or expressed
through art. The second popular assumption was that if a thing was not true, it had no
place in public works of art. In other words, Wilde had to combat the wide-spread belief
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that art should replicate reality, and that reality is defined by moral conviction. These
prescriptive rules relegated art to the role of a guideline. Generations of artists and critics
had taken sides on Horace’s declared purpose of art “to delight and instruct.” Wilde, true
to form, modified Horace and concluded that, since truth was largely a matter of
experience, art should delight and inquire.
Wilde found his means of inquiry and his mode of individualism in the midst of
strict Victorian morality through his unique theory of artistic criminality. Believing that,
for the intellectual, art formed a parallel with the crimes of the destitute, Wilde began to
view art as the non-violent crime that allowed him to express his socially and morally
“criminal” nature—a nature that rebelled against the arbitrary laws and simple answers
accepted by so many of his contemporaries. He rejected the responsibility of the artist to
produce moral and didactic art. While he wrote poems and created characters that flew in
the face of Victorian ideals, a large part of his own moral sense demanded that he turn the
tables on society, revealing all of its own immorality. Well aware of society’s tendency to
equate the “immoral” with the “criminal,” Wilde made in his plays a mockery of society
as corrupt. Take, for example, Lady Bracknell in The Importance of Being Earnest, who
interviews a suitor for her daughter’s hand. She inquires as to his age, financial situation,
and housing arrangements (including the fashionability of the neighborhood). He
qualifies in all these areas, but Lady Bracknell ultimately disqualifies the young man on
the basis of unknown parentage—for the ideal candidate is not only comfortably solvent,
but also of impeccable descent. Careful never to actually offend the audience he
poignantly portrayed, Wilde nevertheless employed all his witticism and apparent
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flippancy against a society that overlooked the mortal sins of envy and deceit while
arranging marriages as though they were impersonal business transactions.
Wilde’s covert crimes of criticism through art were eventually eclipsed by a trial
that threatened to transition Wilde the individualist from the experiences of intellectual
inquiry and art to the experiences of the convicted lawbreaker. When Wilde went to trial
charged with gross misconduct in 1895, his status as a champion of the creative process
attracted the attention of critics and budding proto-psychoanalysts. By the early 1890’s
Max Nordau, J. F. Nisbet, Francis Galton, and Havelock Ellis had all written books on
the connection between men of genius and moral degeneration. Josef Breuer and Freud
published the history of Anna O. and other cases in Studies on Hysteria in 1895. While
Freud’s first major solo work would not be published until 1900, the field that would
eventually be called psychoanalysis was already coming into existence. The popular
assumption seemed to be that only a mind deranged could conceive of inventing and
extolling the “immoral,” as his novel The Picture of Dorian Grey had been accused of
doing. The Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso, one of Wilde’s contemporary’s, wrote
a book in 1888 (the English translation was published in 1891) entitled Man of Genius,
proposing that creative genius was a form of hereditary insanity. Lombroso’s general
analysis of men of letters is eerily reminiscent of Wilde’s art and personality. Wilde’s
penchant for paradox and exaggeration resulted in a public reputation hinging on excess
and hubris. His literary style was no less peculiar and stylized, and all these were factors
that, according to Lombroso, pointed towards insanity and could be labeled “morbid
phenomena” (qtd. in Gagnier, Idylls 148).
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Because the charges against Wilde included an accusation of homosexual activity,
the consternation of the Victorian upper-class later sought reassurance in Lombroso’s
1899 work entitled Crime: Its Causes and Remedies. Published two years after Wilde’s
release from Reading Gaol, Lombroso’s new book, in combination with Man of Genius,
only encouraged the reactionary Victorians in their condemnation of Wilde. Crime: Its
Causes and Remedies declared that a divergent sexual appetite resulted from a lack of
interest in science and altruism, and from the financial comfort that allows the criminal
“an over-abundant diet”—a description that again fit Wilde with his aesthetic philosophy
and his well-known reputation for appreciating the culinary arts (qtd. in Gagnier, Idylls
148). In Lombroso’s way of thinking an unusual need for sexual gratification is the surest
sign that the brain is unbalanced. Needless to say, these theories thrilled the Victorian
moralists, seeming not only to vindicate their discomposure when confronted with Wilde,
but also to ease their burden of association: Wilde may be a member of the upper classes,
but his behavior is the result of madness. The fact that so many embraced Lombroso’s
rantings demonstrates the degree to which the majority of Victorian society had entirely
failed to comprehend or had refused to accept the true complexity of Wilde’s writings.
Far from quibbling over the cause of immorality, Wilde was questioning the very
standards of morality itself. Throughout his works, Wilde proposes that society’s entire
understanding of evil and, as Wilde terms it, sin, is faulty—and it is to this firm denial of
reality that art owes its dark reputation.
Perhaps in Wilde’s case that reputation was not helped by the fact that Wilde
often used common words, but with a definition specific to his own use. As a result, the
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uninitiated would have had difficulty in identifying any sort of moral compass. That is
probably what Wilde intended, at least in part. His artistic inquiry often focused on the
arbitrary standards of morality in his own society, and he even went so far as to
encourage “lying”—that is, to think and see beyond the realm of physical reality and the
limitations of traditional presuppositions. Two of his earliest publications serve as prime
examples of the artist exploring similarities and distinctions within the worlds of art and
crime: “The Decay of Lying” (1891), and The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891). In his
essay “The Decay of Lying” Wilde extols the virtue of imagination and invention in art,
setting up an opposition to the dreary realism of contemporary popular fiction. “The
Decay of Lying” suggests that the real travesty in fiction is for the artist strictly to imitate
life, to follow blindly the rules of reality. Through the themes of crime vs. immorality,
art, and artistic responsibility in The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde examines the creed
of the Aesthetes. His belief in the necessity of imagination and inquiry in art is
consistently represented throughout all of his work. What does change is Wilde’s use of
the ”lie,” his own acknowledgment of the interaction between reality and art. Before his
time in prison, Wilde seemed content to express himself in his own terms, with little or
no desire for the comprehension of the audience to extend beyond a laugh. His
motivation appears to be more cathartic than overtly revolutionary. In the next two
chapters we will see how the lie transforms from a term for imagination and
dissimulation, as it is used in “The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of Dorian Grey. The
lie becomes a tool of clarity and a call to action in the realm of physical reality through
the post-incarceration works The Ballad of Reading Gaol and De Profundis. These works
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demonstrate the effect of the artist’s experiences, observable as the goal of Wilde’s art
develops beyond expressions of the disconnected individualist seeking knowledge
through the pursuit of Paterian ecstasy, and becomes a judgment of society and the state
of the individual within it.
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CHAPTER THREE
LIARS AND MURDERERS: THE PERILS OF RESCUING FICTION FROM THE
MORASS OF REALISM
Wilde’s developing aesthetic theories finally came together in one of his first
published essays “The Decay of Lying” (1889). This brief treatise on the nature of
fiction and the role of the imagination in artistic creation employed the trope of the “liar”
and “lying” to describe the artist and his work. The next step was naturally to write a
work of fiction exemplifying his aesthetic philosophy, and so Wilde’s only novel, The
Picture of Dorian Gray—which first appeared as a story in the July 1890 issue of the
Philadelphian Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine—was published in England in an expanded
and revised version in April 1891. In Dorian Gray, Wilde practiced all that he had
preached in “The Decay of Lying,” demonstrating his conviction that the role of art was
to invent and challenge. However, the public’s outraged response to Dorian Gray and the
aesthetic philosophy the novel embodied revealed a disconnection between Wilde’s
intention and the practical execution. According to Richard Ellmann, Wilde “insisted that
the book had struck a moral note and had been misread” (Oscar Wilde 349-350). The
confusion over the moral message of the book was caused in part by the hyper-sensitivity
of middle-class Victorians to anything touching standards of morality, but it was also due
to the unique vocabulary invented by Wilde and unknown to his general readership.
“The Decay of Lying,” in which much of Wilde’s aesthetic vocabulary is defined,
deals with his theories on imagination and art. By presenting his ideas as a conversation
between two characters, Vivian and Cyril, Wilde is able not only to present his own
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ideas, but also to respond casually to the various opinions and traditional views of his
audience. The conversational structure also provides the advantage, as I have already
hinted, of keeping the treatment at a laymen’s level—thereby allowing for a leeway in
thoroughness that might not have been considered legitimate if the essay had been
presented as the systematic theory of an academic. This is not surprising, as the whole
concept of a systematic aesthetic philosophy would have been loathsome to Wilde.
Wilde does, however, include definitions for the commons terms that take on
specific and unique meaning in his essay. When Wilde remarks, “If a man is sufficiently
unimaginative to produce evidence in support of a lie, he might just as well speak the
truth at once,” his definition of imagination begins to take shape (“Decay of Lying” 292).
A mind limited by fact cannot be truly imaginative. Thus, when Wilde proceeds from
what is unimaginative to a call for “Lying in art,” the reader begins to understand that
Wilde’s definition of lying has more to do with the expressions of the imagination than
with truth-telling. Nature, too, is specified “to mean natural simple instinct as opposed to
self-conscious culture” (“Decay of Lying” 300-301). This conception of nature is in
response to the Romantics, whose definition of Nature, according to Wilde, allowed men
to “only discover in her what they bring to her” (301). Wilde’s validation of instinct
liberated the notion of convention in art. At one point in “The Decay of Lying” Wilde
mentions one of his favorite artistic genres: “Orientalism, with its frank rejection of
imitation, its love of artistic convention, its dislike to the actual representation of any
object in Nature, and our own imitative spirit” (“Decay of Lying” 303). It is Wilde’s
aversion to mimetic art and his delight in convention that drives his aesthetic theory in
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general. In particular, “The Decay of Lying” is an effort to highlight the lack of
convention in contemporary fiction. After all, in Wilde’s philosophy of art, truth itself “is
entirely and absolutely a matter of style” (“Decay of Lying” 305), and art is “a veil, rather
than a mirror” (306). The realization of this aesthetic philosophy, however, required a
whole new way of thinking about art, and it is to this end that he challenges his readers to
consider afresh the purpose of art. He hoped to inspire a “Renaissance of art” (“Decay of
Lying” 292) by convincing his contemporaries that “the object of art is not simple truth,
but complex beauty” (302).
In “The Decay of Lying,” Wilde is concerned with the liberation of the
imagination and the enjoyment of its creations. Although it does not surface until the
middle of the essay, the premise of Wilde’s philosophy is simply that “art never
expressed anything but itself” (“Decay of Lying” 313). This axiom frees art and the artist
from all constraints related to providing an example for society and to the criticism of its
role as a moral compass. According to Wilde, the subject matter of art is indifferent to
moral or ethical judgment (Wilde also implies that the more indifferent we are to the
subject matter, the more honest our appreciation of the work can be, existing for the sake
of Beauty and the artist alone). Wilde’s theory also liberates art from the weighty burden
of reproducing or re-presenting things as they are already. This is why Wilde chooses to
use the term “lying” for art and “liar” for the artist—not because they speak in
deceptions, but because they produce a creative depiction of the world that is divergent
from their present reality.
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As Wilde’s Vivian explains, the object of the liar, within the realm of art, is
“simply to charm, to delight, to give pleasure” (“Decay of Lying” 305). It is an argument
not against some notion of objective truth, but rather an exhortation to abandon a simply
mimetic method of art in favor of an imaginative and creative one. Wilde briefly
mentions and analyzes the popular realists who went “directly to life for everything”—
Hardy, James, de Maupassant, Zola, etc. . . (”Decay of Lying” 293). Through Vivian,
Wilde scorns the works of the realists and the naturalists, contending that the
transposition of “real life” to the page is not artistic invention at all, but merely “dull
facts under the guise of fiction” (293). Bad art is, according to Wilde, the result of raising
nature and life to ideals.
It is the imagination that conceives of life as it might be, something entirely
“other” than the known reality. In fact, while considering Émile Zola, the father of
naturalism and Wilde’s contemporary, Wilde declares: “In literature we require
distinction, charm, beauty, and imaginative power. We don’t want to be harrowed and
disgusted with an account of the doings of the lower orders” (“Decay of Lying” 296).
This desire for art to ignore certain aspects of reality is consistent with Wilde’s aversion
to pain and suffering, as well as a testament to the imagination’s ability to transcend the
harshness of life. Wilde calls art that focuses on the dark aspect of life “wrong not on the
ground of morals, but on the ground of art” (“Decay of Lying 296). His criticism is
purely that of a reader who is bored by the trudging commonness of realism’s characters:
“They have their dreary vices, and their drearier virtues. The record of their lives is
absolutely without interest. Who cares what happens to them?” (296). In other words,
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why would he spend his time reading about the boring people next door? The difference
between a book that creates a focused reproduction of reality with all its unpleasant
aspects and one that creates a recognizable but original world is the difference, in Wilde’s
words, between “unimaginative realism and imaginative reality” (“Decay of Lying” 299).
It was the popularity of unimaginative realism in literature that compelled Wilde
to express his frustration and concern for art produced in a culture that was preoccupied
with pragmatic certainties: “if something cannot be done to check, or at least to modify,
our monstrous worship of facts, Art will become sterile, and Beauty will pass away from
the land” (“Decay of Lying” 294-295). This idea is central to Wilde’s aesthetic in “The
Decay of Lying” as he seeks to reverse the common conception that art imitates life. On
the contrary, he argues, life is very much the product of art. He recounts the story of a
hostess’s comparison of a real sunset to one of Turner’s paintings and the obligation felt
by a young woman of his acquaintance to emulate the choices of a serial heroine. This
anecdotal evidence supports Wilde’s theory that through the inspiring creativeness of the
individual, art leads the way for life. Once an individual has been exposed to a work of
art, all correlating realities are in turn judged by that idealized standard—i.e., an actual
sunset is compared to a painted one. Wilde also observes that life, unfortunately, often
“gets the upper hand, and drives Art out into the wilderness” (“Decay of Lying 301). This
seeming contradiction is merely an explanation for the slow and incremental progress of
society, for, if art is “really a form of exaggeration. . . and selection, which is the very
spirit of art, is nothing more than an intensified mode of over-emphasis” (302) then it is
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inevitable, as Wilde said, that “Society sooner or later must return to its lost leader, the
cultured and fascinating liar” (305).
Wilde experienced society’s reluctance in the face of artistic progress when his
novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray, was published in 1891—the same year that “The
Decay of Lying” was republished as part of a four-essay volume entitled Intentions,
which also included the essay “Pen, Pencil, and Poison.” A faithful application of
Wilde’s aesthetic philosophy, the novel chronicles the moral corruption of a young man
after he sells his soul to attain eternal youth. Convinced by the flippant Lord Henry
Wotton that the key to life is happiness through experience, Dorian embarks on a life of
sensory exploration. Because his pursuit of happiness is entirely egocentric, Dorian
progresses down an ever more slippery slope of wrongdoing, immorality, and eventually
crime. The portrait reflects the effects of his choices, and not only ages but also acquires
the physiognomy of an evil-doer. For decades Dorian appears not to age at all. At the end
of the tale, Dorian is exhausted by the weight of his guilt and attempts to reverse the
effects of all his evil by doing a good deed. Upon discovering that no number of good
deeds can redeem him, Dorian attempts to destroy the painting, but only succeeds in
destroying himself. The final page of the novel describes a servant discovering the
“withered, wrinkled, and loathsome” body of an old man lying in front of the portrait of
the beautiful and young Dorian Gray (Dorian Gray 213).
All the rules for imaginative fiction as laid down in “The Decay of Lying,” are
exemplified in Dorian Gray. Wilde’s first and only novel was a unique blend of the
escape from realism championed in “The Decay of Lying” and the concerns of the
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budding modernists. The romantic ideal of a young man coming to know himself and his
world through experience became an entirely new proposition once nature was no longer
the chosen environment for that discovery. As Arnold had expounded and Wilde’s
aesthetic rebellion displayed, modern England was transitioning from a culture content
with codified knowledge to a people awakened to uncertainties—and in a time when
absolutes seemed to be falling apart, it was only appropriate for fiction to take on an
aspect of unreality as well.
Centered on one magical trope, a portrait that can reflect the deteriorating soul of
its subject while leaving Dorian eternally young, Wilde’s imagination produced a work
including the elements of fairy tale, morality play, and crime novel. The living portrait
and the postponement of aging are conventions of classic fairy tales (for example
Grimms’ “Snow White” of 1812 [English trans] and Jeanne-Marie LePrince de
Beaumont’s “Beauty and the Beast” of 1756), but in Dorian Gray these connections
surpass the common practice of connecting two people. Here the picture functions as a
window into the soul and as the harbinger of consequences to come. As he explores
deeper and deeper into society’s underworld, Dorian’s gift of eternal youth serves to
expose the dichotomy between appearances and reality. Neither of these themes—the
deferment of consequences or the failure of things to appear as they are—were foreign to
the literature of Wilde’s day. But while Dickens and Thackeray punish their characters in
good time through the loss of finances and social standing, both very realistic outcomes
in ideal worlds where most wrongs are made right, Wilde besets his Dorian with the
image of his own evolving doom. This doom takes a unique form, for the reader assumes
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that the ultimate result will merely be the loss of Dorian’s good looks which is, in his
own words, the loss of “everything” and sufficient motive for suicide (Dorian Gray 28).
The absurdities of the novel, such as the one just mentioned, are examples of what Wilde
meant by “lying” in art. While the reader acknowledges that it would be a very foolish
young man, indeed, who killed himself at the first sign of a wrinkle, Dorian Gray is
nevertheless, a fascinating and entertaining figure reminiscent of fairy-tale archetypes.
As a morality play, The Picture of Dorian Gray has its Dr. Faustus moment with
Lord Henry playing the part of Mephistopheles. Lord Henry flatters Dorian on his
remarkable good looks and then laments: “Our limbs fail, our senses rot. We degenerate
into hideous puppets. . . .There is absolutely nothing in the world but youth” (Dorian
Gray 25). This prompts Dorian to respond with the cry: “If the picture could change, and
I could be always what I am now” and to collapse on the couch “as though he was
praying” (Dorian Gray 28). And, miraculously, all the effects of life’s wear and tear upon
Dorian’s body are transferred to the portrait. This transference is effectually a redemption
from the effects of the fall of man as described in Genesis, for, in evangelicalism, it is at
the moment when Adam replaces the image of God with an image of himself that the
consequence of aging and death is introduced. Of course, this novel is also a fairy tale, so
there is no divine being, only an unknown source of power that allows Dorian to make
his own portrait a temporary scapegoat. Perhaps this is another nod to the morality play,
for the characters always rise to heaven or descend to hell alone—with or without their
good works.
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Dorian Gray the crime novel realizes both the convention of “The Decay of
Lying” and the aesthetics of crime described in “Pen, Pencil, Poison.” For example, the
body of the murdered painter, Basil Hallward, is entirely broken down by a chemical
compound and nothing is left of the corpse but “a horrible smell of nitric acid (Dorian
Gray 166). Dorian’s aversion to the miasma of chemicals is only matched by his horror at
the sight of a body he had just rendered lifeless. Dorian’s egocentricity is always made
manifest by his aesthetic concerns. Aspects of the crime novel observable in Dorian Gray
also include scenes of disguise, premeditation, and the hiding of evidence. Most uniquely,
the role of the hounding detective is replaced by a conscience, taking the form of the
portrait. More than any external consequence Dorian is trying, with every sin of omission
and commission, to escape from himself. (In this sense, Dorian Gray, as a crime novel, is
a psychological one and comparable in many ways to the work of Edgar Allen Poe
(1809-1849), the poet whom, according to Ellmann, Wilde admired even more than he
did his idols Whitman and Emerson (167).)
The convergence of fairy tale, morality play, and crime novel in The Picture of
Dorian Gray exemplifies Wilde’s autonomy from the strict categories of genre and from
the realism he so abhorred. But Wilde’s personal success in creating a work that
embodied his own aesthetic theory did not translate into a sweeping success in the public
eye. In fact, readers were so unsure of what to make of the novel that the general reaction
was absolutely polarized. Because Dorian Gray was an accurate reflection of his own
conviction that fiction should be imaginative reality, Wilde’s novel offers no exposition
or analysis of its characters. The ambiguity of the final scene is intentional—we will
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never know if Dorian’s death was suicide or an unexpected consequence of trying to
break the magical contract. The reader is left unguided, free to contemplate the moral of
the story in terms of personal proclivity— and that appears to be exactly what each
Victorian reader did! Because the tale includes murders, suicides, homosexuality, drug
use, etc. . . many readers and reviewers railed against The Picture of Dorian Gray,
seeming to find the novel to be entirely without morality, let alone a moral.
Robert Mighall’s introduction to the Penguin edition of The Portrait of Dorian
Gray includes some helpful history of the book’s reception. The review in W. E.
Henley’s Scots’s Observer called the novel fit only “for the Criminal Investigation
Department” and declared it a threat to the “public morals,” pronouncing the book “false
art. . .false to human nature—for its hero is a devil; it is false to morality—for it is not
made sufficiently clear that the writer does not prefer a course of unnatural iniquity to a
life of cleanliness, health, and sanity” (Mighall x). The review in the Daily Chronicle
began: “Dullness and dirt are the chief features of Lippincott’s [the journal in which
Dorian Gray was serialized] this month,” continuing to identify the moral of the story:
[being] that when you feel yourself becoming too angelic you cannot do better
than rush out and make a beast of yourself. There is not a single good or holy
impulse of human nature, scarcely a fine feeling or instinct that civilization, art,
and religion, have developed throughout the ages as part of the barriers between
Humanity and Animalism that is not held up to ridicule and contempt in Dorian
Gray. . . . (Dorian Gray 217)
On the other hand, the Christian Leader gave the novel a glowing endorsement:
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With a subtle power it portrays the gilded paganism which has been staining these
latter years of the Victorian epoch with horrors that carry us back to the worst
incidents in the history of ancient Rome. . .in the tragic picture of Dorian Gray’s
life. . .Mr. Wilde has performed a service to his age. . . .We can only hope that it
will be read and pondered by those classes of British society whose corruption it
delineates with such thrilling power, and that it may be a means of preserving
many young lives from the temptations by which they are surrounded. (Dorian
Gray 219)
Certainly, Wilde was not too distressed by these reactions. His own preface to The
Picture of Dorian Gray was contained a number of paradoxes and aphorisms, two of
which spoke precisely to the situation: “Diversity of opinion about a work of art shows
that the work is new, complex, and vital” (Dorian Gray 4). The second aphorism, “When
critics disagree the artist is in accord with himself,” explains Wilde’s reaction to the
reviews his novel received (4). Through letters to the editors, Wilde responded to these
disparate reviews with complacence. For example, to the editor of the Scots Observer,
Wilde replied: “For if a work of art is rich, and vital, and complete, those who have
artistic instincts will see its beauty, and those to whom ethics appeal more strongly than
aesthetics will see its moral lesson” (“Defense of Dorian Gray” 249). This is perhaps the
best explanation of what Wilde meant by his aphorism in the novel’s preface: “It is the
spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors” (Dorian Gray 4), and certainly the
reactions of his readers seemed to prove it true.
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But Wilde responded to those who called his book immoral with more than a
repetition of his theory that all art is exempt from the exercise of moral and ethical
judgment. With a tone of little asperity and great disbelief, Wilde expressed his surprise
that the novel’s moral, which he had feared was too obvious, had become the subject of
so much doubt and debate. To the editor of the St. James Gazette Wilde defended his
work, saying “it is a story with a moral. And the moral is this: all Excess, as well as all
renunciation, brings its own punishment” (“Defense of Dorian Gray” 240). Writing to the
editor of the Daily Chronicle, Wilde added: “the real trouble I experienced in writing the
story was that of keeping the extremely obvious moral subordinate to the artistic and
dramatic effect” (245). In fact, Wilde illuminated the entire purpose of his novel for all
Victorian Philistines when he declared in yet another letter to the editor of the St. James
Gazette: “What my story is, is an interesting problem” (“Defense of Dorian Gray” 244).
Had his readership taken the time to read beyond the elements of virtue and evil that
were, according to Wilde, necessary “for the dramatic development of this story. . . .
Otherwise the story would have had no meaning and no plot issue,” they would have
realized that Wilde has indeed carefully constructed an examination of science and
religion, the individual and society, and theory and experience (248). As Michael
Gillespie noted in the preface to the 2007 Norton edition, the novel is “determined to
explore the contradictory elements of human nature without falling back on conventional
pieties” (xi).
It was Wilde’s awareness of the complexity of life that compelled him to write, as
Ellmann put it so well, “out of a debate between doctrines, not from a doctrine,”
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revealing the modus operandi for The Picture of Dorian Gray. Other scholars have
noticed Wilde’s inclusion of contending theories as well. Regenia Gagnier chronicles
Wilde’s interaction with evolutionary science when she cites Philip E. Smith II and
Michael S. Helfand in their observation:
[A]t Oxford Wilde reconciled evolutionary science and philosophical idealism.
Specifically, he rejected any methodological individualism that saw the individual
as the basic social unit and identity as analyzable apart from society, in favor of
Herbert Spencer’s and William Kingdon Clifford’s theories of cultural evolution,
in which individuals inherited their characteristics from their cultures. (Gagnier,
Wilde and the Victorians 25)
While this may seem to contradict Wilde’s philosophy of the individualist, it is important
to remember that Wilde advocated the resistance against being defined by something
outside your experience. This understanding of the formation of the individual assumes
that there is a framework in which a person can be raised or persuaded to adopt beliefs
that contradict their personal experience—that is, their culture.
Expanding on Wilde’s interest in the individual in relation to culture, Joseph
Carroll examines the novel through the lens of “two competing visions of human nature”
(287) in “Aestheticism, Homoeroticism, and Christian Guilt in The Picture of Dorian
Gray” (2005). The first “vision” is social science according to Darwin, who implies in the
conclusion to his Descent of Man (1871), that the evils of human nature are linked to our
physicality, the marks of our having not yet completed our evolution:
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[W]e must acknowledge. . . that man with all his noble qualities. . .with his
godlike intellect which has penetrated into the movements and constitution of the
solar system—with all these exalted powers—Man still bears in his bodily frame
the indelible stamp of his lowly origin. (1690)
The second view of human nature is “the traditional Christian conception of the soul”
(Carroll 287). The two competing systems, Darwinism and Christianity, “share certain
concepts of the human moral and social character, but they couch those concepts in
different idioms, and they would invoke wholly different casual explanations for how
human nature came to be the way it is” (287). Beyond a difference in Darwinism and
Christianity on the subject of the explanation for human nature’s state is their solution to
the existence of evil in human nature. For Darwin, as mentioned earlier, human nature is
linked to evil through the physical. Thus, in Darwinism, human nature’s progress away
from evil is connected to, if not dependent upon, physical progress through evolution.
Christianity, on the other hand, teaches that an individual progresses away from
evil through spiritual means, and in spite of their physicality. For example, the Apostle
Paul declares:
For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my
members, warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to
the law of sin which is in my members. . . .Who shall deliver me from the body of
this death?” (Romans 7:22-24)
In the minds of many church-going Victorians, the opposition of Christianity to
Darwinism was far from subtle. Charles Hadden Spurgeon (1834-1892), one of the most

38

well-known of 19th-century England’s Baptist preachers, spoke to thousands of church
attendees every Sunday morning for forty years—the majority of those years at London’s
famous Metropolitan Tabernacle. Never reluctant to address contemporary ideas,
Spurgeon addressed Darwin’s theory of evolution in 1886 in a sermon entitled “Hideous
Discovery:”
In its bearing upon religion this vain notion is, however, no theme for mirth, for it
is not only deceptive, but it threatens to be mischievous in a high degree. There is
not a hair of truth upon this dog from its head to its tail, but it rends and tears the
simple ones. In all its bearing upon scriptural truth, the evolution theory is in
direct opposition to it. If God’s Word be true, evolution is a lie. I will not mince
the matter: this is not the time for soft speaking. (Spurgeon 397)
Spurgeon is clearly in the business of establishing objective truth—the existence of which
we already know Wilde doubted. But the popularity of Spurgeon’s sermons and their
publication in newspapers, both in London and throughout the British Empire, is
evidence of the question in the minds of many Christians as to whether or not the theory
of evolution and the claim to scriptural infallibility could peacefully co-exist.
Of course, Wilde is not interested in solving the debate. Wilde presents this
problem of the source and meaning of human nature as just that: a problem. He doesn’t
argue for Darwinian evolution or Christianity’s story of creation and the fall of man. He
is concerned, as ever, with experience. Perhaps, for Wilde, experience trumps these
cosmological questions. In Dorian Gray, Wilde’s primary character is confused by
competing theories on the nature of man, a crucial issue when it comes to the question of
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how man is to be made happy. Lord Henry Wotton tells Dorian that “the body sins once,
and has done with its sin, for action is a mode of purification. . . .The only way to get rid
of a temptation is to yield to it” (Dorian Gray 21). In this theory, there is only a kind of
existential quest for gratification and experience. But Dorian’s desire is never satiated,
and his conscience—the image in the picture frame— drives him to suicide. Either
Dorian feels guilt because he has not, in Arnold’s terms, evolved to the state where he
can rightly balance the aspects of his nature (morality and intellect), or he feels guilty
because he has internalized an understanding of what Carroll calls the “Christian pathos”
(288). Either way, Dorian’s experience is the same.
But Wilde describes Dorian’s experience with the portrait with a loaded term: “It
had been a like a conscience to him” (Dorian Gray 212). It is the question of conscience
that links religion and science with the issue of society and the individual. Is the mirror
actually a reflection of Dorian’s own conscience? Or is it a visual representation of how
Dorian’s Christian society would see him if they knew all his secrets? We must not forget
the reputation of the “immoral” artist and the interchangeability of the words “immoral”
and “criminal” within Wilde’s broader social context. In the relationship between the
book and the reader, it seems clear that Wilde has drawn a metaphoric connection
between himself as an “immoral” artist and Dorian as a “criminal,” and again between his
artistic expression and Dorian’s crimes. More than just a picture of the character Dorian’s
conscience, the portrait doubles as the “unjust mirror” (Dorian Gray 212) of society’s
“strictness of conscience” (Arnold 145). In other words, Dorian and his crimes parallel
the artist and his “immorality.” Dorian’s image in the portrait changes after Dorian’s does
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things that would be universally condemned—like murder, but also for less certain evils
such as his opium use. While Dorian Gray is certainly a criticism of extreme
aestheticism, it does question the legitimacy of a socially codified morality.
Encompassing the questions associated with religion, science, culture, and the
individual is the exploration of what happens to a person when he or she tries to live as
though the consciousness of man is only two-dimensional. Dorian lives as though what
seems to be true in theory is actually true in life. Having jettisoned any working
definition of morality, Dorian is not even able to tell when he has crossed from
immorality and into criminality. For example, when the hitherto innocent young man jilts
his actress fiancé Sybil Vane, an action more amoral than immoral, she promptly
commits suicide. Her decision produces Dorian’s response: “So I have murdered Sybil
Vane…murdered her as surely as if I had cut her little throat with a knife” (Dorian Gray
96). Dorian’s own death, the ultimate consequence of his choices, stands in interesting
contrast to Lord Henry’s comment that “nothing makes one so vain as being told that one
is a sinner. Conscience makes egoists of us all” (99). Of course Hamlet mused:
“conscience does make cowards of us all” (emphasis mine) (Shakespeare 1208). Hamlet
was describing cowardice in the face of death, which also makes cowards of us all. And
yet Dorian later tells Lord Henry that, while he doesn’t fear “Death” itself, “it is the
coming of Death that terrifies me” (Dorian Gray 195). It seems that conscience made
Dorian a coward as well—he knows that he deserves to die, and yet he does not want to
surrender the experiential pursuits that condemn him. Dorian wants to go on living even
though he knows that “[t]he wretched peasant who has just died is better off than I am”
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(Dorian Gray 194). The reader is left to consider the possibility that Dorian has come to
believe, perhaps even on an unconscious level, that the hedonistic philosophies of Lord
Henry which have captivated him for so long have actually betrayed him.
The death of Dorian reveals, I think, a pervasive doctrine that ultimately fails and
was designed to fail. A reckless hedonist and untempered aesthete, Dorian has a life
which fails to meet the fulfillment he thought was promised by Lord Henry’s “new
Hedonism” (Dorian Gray 25). This criticism of hedonism reflects the growth in Wilde’s
understanding of Pater’s philosophy. Wilde, the one-time hedonist now echoes the more
lofty ideals of his mentor. In fact, Pater immediately identified his pupil’s work as an
example of what not to do. Pater’s review of The Picture of Dorian Gray observed:
A true Epicureanism aims at a complete though harmonious development of
man’s entire organism. To lose the moral sense therefore, for instance, the sense
of sin and righteousness, as Mr Wilde’s hero—his heroes are bent on doing as
speedily, as completely as they can, is to lose, or lower, organization, to become
less complex, to pass from a higher to a lower degree of development. (Pater,
“Novel by OW” 221)
Pater seems to have been the only published critic to discover, however incompletely, the
fault of excess around which Wilde so intentionally built his tale. As noted earlier, the
majority of Wilde’s audience entirely failed to see the point, dismissing the book as the
product of a corrupt mind.
Wilde responded to those who called his book corrupt by proclaiming to the
editor of the St. James Gazette: “I wrote this book entirely for my own pleasure, and it
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gave me very great pleasure to write it. Whether it becomes popular or not is a matter of
absolute indifference to me” (“Defense of Dorian Gray” 238). As Wilde intended, his
word choice and lack of narrational exposition left a wide range of interpretations open.
Take for example the passage quoted earlier: “the body sins once, and has done with its
sin, for action is a mode of purification. . . .The only way to get rid of a temptation is to
yield to it” (Dorian Gray 21). The average member of Victorian Christian society would
assume evangelical definitions for the words “sin,” “temptation,” and “purification.”
With those meanings, this passage essentially implies that man should not be concerned
with a divine being who has labeled certain things “sin,” but rather should give in to
natural desires and relieve itself of the longing. That is, in fact, exactly what Lord
Henry’s character is saying—and the application of that philosophy brings about
Dorian’s death. But what is Wilde saying?
Lord Henry’s whole philosophy is just the exaggeration of one optional approach
to life; the novel certainly includes a criticism of the Decadent movement in the final
outcome of such a hedonistic philosophy. Wilde cares, not about the terminology or the
socio-religious connotations of the character’s theories, but about the whole question of
how one ought to live. If we adopt Wilde’s conviction that “It is the spectator, and not
life, that art really mirrors” (Dorian Gray 4), it is clear that Wilde intended the novel, not
as a manual for corruption, but as a kind of fictional and intellectual exploration. “Sin”
and “temptation” are merely his culture’s labels for offense and desire. The evangelical
interpretation assumes that there is a divine being to be offended—in his novel Wilde is
calling even that fundamental premise into question. In doing so, Wilde also questions
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the traditionally accepted definitions of good and evil. If the rules that have hitherto been
functioning as the standard of morality are in fact based upon a false premise—that God
wrote the rules down and gave them to mankind to follow—then perhaps there is actually
a different standard of morality under the rule of science, or even simply according to the
desires of man. Certainly, in the language of the times, Wilde’s novel was immoral. But
perhaps Wilde would have been gratified had his readers had the perspicacity to
recognize that Dorian Gray’s transgressions against the social conscience were intended
to raise questions, not eyebrows. Unfortunately, undiscerning readers allowed the mask
of the novel—the immoral plot and subject matter—to entirely obscure the legitimate
issues raised in the novel.
In spite of Wilde’s protestations that a work of art cannot be subjected to ethical
analysis, Victorian readers were not yet prepared for the literature produced by the
creative artist of Wilde’s “Decay of Lying.” Wilde had written a novel that reflected his
interest in experience and revealed his sensitivity to “the revelation of personality through
choice and preference” (Gagnier, Idylls 22). As “The Decay of Lying” stipulated, Wilde
had employed invention and imagination in his novel. Not bound by realism, he created a
recognizable world with familiar dilemmas and fantastical situations— every reader is
familiar with the tension between desire and restraint, but no reader has a portrait that
grows in their place. The Picture of Dorian Gray not only fulfilled Wilde’s stylistic and
ideological prescriptions for charming art, but also exemplified his dictum that art “is a
veil rather than a mirror” (“Decay of Lying” 306). Through The Picture of Dorian Gray,
Wilde created a world that, instead of recreating the world as we know it, created an
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exaggerated example of human experience—a world in which the physical and external
(social) consequences of unbridled hedonism are temporarily suspended.
Unfortunately, there was no one to draw a veil over the artist’s life—those who
were uncomfortable with Wilde’s works did not ask questions. Instead, they made
accusations. Contrary to the assertion of Dorian Gray’s narrator that “society is never
very ready to believe anything to the detriment of those both rich and fascinating,”
Victorian society was all too eager to believe that Wilde was the paradox-spouting Lord
Henry in public, and the morally-deteriorating Dorian Gray in private (Dorian Gray 136).
This reputation, born from fiction, preceded Wilde into the courtroom in 1895, some four
years after the publication of Dorian Gray. Wilde had glorified the youth and beauty of a
young man and questioned the moral status quo. These circumstances alone were enough
to cast doubt upon his “moral” character, and to justify the accusation of every publically
reprehensible wrong conceivable. I say publically reprehensible because implicit in the
charge of gross misconduct that would be leveled against Wilde in 1895 was an
accusation of homosexual activity, and like so many other Victorian immoralities,
homosexuality was only immoral if it became public.
The Marquess of Queensberry introduced Wilde’s so-called immorality to the
public in 1894. A controlling and jealous man, the Marquess of Queensberry was
convinced that Wilde was corrupting his son, and took every opportunity presented him
to insult and defame Wilde. The Douglas’s had been estranged for some time prior to the
trial, and the son, Lord Alfred, was only too eager to encourage Wilde to humiliate
Queensberry in court by bringing a libel suit against him. Far outstripped in wealth,
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Wilde had a mediocre prosecutor who was obliged to take on some of the most famous
barristers of the time. One of these, Mr. Carson, “suggested that Dorian Gray was
perverted” (Ellmann 449). Wilde responded: “That could only be to brutes and illiterates.
The views of Philistines on art are incalculably stupid” (449).
Wilde embraced the notion that a society and its individuals should be
inextricably linked, and he wrote his novel as he did because he believed in “the
inheritance of progressive characteristics: precisely because life imitates art, art should be
progressive” (Gagnier, Wilde and the Victorians 25). He could not explain to the willfully
ignorant masses in general, and the courtroom in particular, that his novel was not
intended to extol the virtues of controversial behavior, but rather was designed to pose
questions, to expose the insufficiencies of man as he tried to systematize, quantify, and
(de)moralize human experience. Wilde recognized that “Lord Henry is what the world
thinks me,” and indeed that was how the lawyers described him (Ellmann, Oscar Wilde
319). It must have been to Wilde’s great distress that no one saw the flaw in Carson’s
argument: Wilde did not embody the whole of Lord Henry’s advice—by making Oscar
Wilde the equivalent of a fictional character, the humanity that Wilde had not allowed
Lord Henry was also denied Wilde during his trial. But perhaps the guilt of the jurors can
be somewhat mitigated when we remember the mask that Wilde had so carefully
constructed. He was known for exaggerated opinions and the flippant dismissal of facts.
Wilde had set the value of things as they were at naught, favoring instead a manufactured
representation of things as they should be.
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This profound disconnect between Wilde and the power of reality over him may
have been the result of an always comfortable life. Perhaps Wilde’s aversion to “the
brotherhood of man” as a “most depressing and humiliating reality,” as expressed in “The
Decay of Lying,” came from the total lack of physical suffering in his own life (297).
Until the proceedings of his libel suit against Queensberry, Wilde’s idea of suffering was
incurring debts as he went out to the most fashionable eateries in London or failing to
gain recognition for his art. But all of that was about to change.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A NEW INDIVIDUALIST: FROM THEORY TO IMAGINATION

Wilde’s trial and ultimately his imprisonment resulted in the creation of two final
written works—De Profundis and The Ballad of Reading Gaol. De Profundis was written
in 1897, while Wilde was still in prison, but because it was a private letter, it was not
published until 1909—nine years after Wilde’s death. When Robert Ross, Wilde’s lifelong friend and executor of his estate, first published the letter, Ross edited the contents
to conceal the fact that De Profundis was in fact a letter to Lord Alfred Douglas. In the
letter Wilde reproaches Douglas for his behavior both before and during Wilde’s
incarceration, but it is primarily an expression of Wilde’s self-recrimination for not
having broken with Douglas at any one of the several opportunities Wilde had had to do
so. Wilde’s examination of the defects in Douglas’ character, specifically Douglas’
selfishness and lack of compassion, eventually grew into a treatise on the value of
imaginative sympathy and an analysis of Wilde’s interpretation of the Christ figure as the
ultimate individualist. While Wilde embraced the notion of the individualist during his
university years as he contemplated the interaction between the individual, society, and
progress, it is explained in greatest detail and most thoroughly developmed in De
Profundis. Wilde’s interpretation of the Christ figure is the greatest interest in relation to
his last work, The Ballad of Reading Gaol. Published anonymously in February of 1898,
almost a year after Wilde was released from Reading Gaol, The Ballad of Reading Gaol
poetically parallels the execution of Christ with the execution of a murderer known to the
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inmates of Reading. It was through De Profundis and The Ballad of Reading Gaol that
Oscar Wilde revealed his convictions on morality—the sense of morality that had been
vehemently declared non-existent by so many who had reviewed The Picture of Dorian
Gray.
The question surrounding his morals eventually landed Wilde in prison. The
rumors of homosexuality that had swarmed around Wilde since his Oxford days
culminated with his libel suite against The Marquess of Queensberry. When the thirty-six
year old Wilde had first met Lord Alfred Douglas in 1891, shortly after the publication of
The Picture of Dorian Gray, Lord Alfred was a twenty-year-old student at Magdelen
College. By 1894, their intimate relationship had so consumed Lord Alfred, or “Bosie” as
his mother and Wilde called him, that his father, Queensberry, was convinced that Wilde
was “taking Bosie over” (Ellmann 424). When Bosie’s eldest brother Drumlanrig died
on October 29, 1894, in what his father believed was a homosexual scandal, Queensberry
became determined to protect Lord Alfred from a similar fate. Finding Bosie deaf to all
his ranting protestations, the hot-tempered Queensberry focused his attention on Wilde.
Had it not been for Wilde’s unflagging tenderness of heart towards Bosie, this strategy
probably would have realized Queensberry’s goal. A spoiled and egocentric young man,
Bosie on several occasions displayed such heartless and dismissive behavior towards
Wilde that the now famous playwright vowed to permanently forsake their friendship.
Yet each time Wilde thought he had renounced Bosie once and for all, the
charming young man would play upon Wilde’s affections, enticing him back. In January
1895 the two men went off to Algeria to escape Queensberry’s barely contained wrath.
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Their return in February was almost immediately marked by a communiqué from the
Marquess of Queensberry. The inscription was never definitely identified at the time, but
according to Richard Ellmann, Wilde probably deciphered “To Oscar Wilde, ponce and
Sodomite” (438). Ellmann maintains that Queensberry actually wrote: “To Oscar Wilde
posing Sodomite”; regardless of the actual phraseology, this insult provoked Wilde to toy
with the idea of bringing a libel suite against Queensberry. Wilde recorded in De
Profundis that Bosie badgered him until it became a reality: “You [Bosie] thought simply
of how to get your father into prison. . .[even saying] that my going bankrupt was really a
splendid score’ off him as he would not then be able to get any of his costs out of me”
(CW 1057-58).
To get Queensberry acquitted, the barrister Edward Carson was obligated to prove
the accusation of sodomy reasonable enough to satisfy a jury. Evidence of Wilde’s
proclivities seemed to rise up unbidden. A prostitute, frustrated by the competition
presented by young male prostitutes, led a detective to the apartment of Alfred Taylor,
who had introduced Wilde to a number of young men and boys. In the apartment, the
detective found a record of all the names and addresses of the men Wilde had
encountered. Most of the young men on the list were persuaded to give evidence against
Wilde. Queensberry, too, had managed to collect evidence against Wilde in the form of
letters written from Wilde to Douglas. As the evidence piled up, the general feeling was
against Wilde, and the trial transformed from a libel suit against the Marquess of
Queensberry into a defense of public sensibilities. Instead of Queensberry, Wilde was on
trial, and the proceeding that Wilde had at first considered with little seriousness quickly
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turned ugly. Because of the evidence against Wilde, the Marquees was declared justified
in calling him a sodomite, and Wilde was in turn charged with gross misconduct on April
5, 1895.
These are the circumstances that promoted the popular notion that Wilde was
indicted because of his morally outrageous behavior. In fact, the only reason Wilde was
taken to trial to answer misconduct charges was that his lawyer, Clarke, had chosen to
read a series of letters from Queensberry to his ex-wife and son. Clarke’s goal was to
demonstrate Queensberry’s distressed state of mind at the time of the conflict with Wilde.
But while Queensberry’s letters revealed a man desperate to save his son from what he
believed was Wilde’s corrupting influence, the letters also involved the names of William
Gladstone and Lord Archibald Roseberry. Wilde had to be prosecuted lest it appear that
Gladstone and Roseberry had favored Wilde because they were themselves
homosexual—as Queensberry, who had begun to suspect almost every London male of
homosexuality, implied in the letters (Ellmann 450). The first painful and humiliating
prosecution of Wilde lasted one month, and when the jury was unable to reach a verdict,
a new trial ensued. The second trial lasted only three days, and, on May 25, 1895, Wilde
was convicted of gross miscondct and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and hard
labor. It almost seems as though the entire situation did not become real for Wilde until
he heard the sentence. His cry of “My God, My God” and near fainting exhibited real
shock, as if he had never considered conviction a real possibility (Ellmann, Oscar Wilde
477).
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Because of the distortions of the truth presented in his trial, and because of the
deep sense of betrayal Wilde felt when he considered Douglas’ role in his life and present
circumstances, Wilde was determined to prepare a record of events according to his own
experience and perspective. This record took the form of a letter written during the last
year of his incarceration: De Profundis. Beginning as a scathing rebuke of Lord Alfred
Douglas but including long sections on aesthetics and Wilde’s personal philosophy, De
Profundis reveals a man changed by prison and pain. But new experiences in prison were
not the only catalysts of change. Stripped of social position, family, material possessions,
and even abandoned by Douglas, Wilde was left to reconstruct a new and sustaining
sense of self.
Throughout De Profundis we can see Wilde’s new identity slowly begin to center
around the suffering of Christ. Written in the same year as “The Decay of Lying” and The
Portrait of Dorian Gray, “The Soul of Man Under Socialism” had expressed his preincarceration opinion on the value of pain: “[The modern world] aims to get rid of pain
and the suffering that it entails. . . . . What it aims at is an Individualism expressing itself
through joy. . . . Pain is not the ultimate mode of perfection. It is merely provisional and a
protest” (Soul 288). After a year and a half in prison Wilde was ready to analyze the
valuable effects of pain upon the individual. He believed that his own suffering, which he
calls “one long moment” in time that “circle[s] round one centre of pain” (De Profundis
1065) had revealed to him the “holy ground” that can only be known through sorrow
(1067). Deprived not only of decent food, living accommodations, and moral support, but
also of all resources for intellectual pursuits like books and writing paraphernalia, he
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discovered that “sorrow is the most sensitive of all created things. There is nothing that
stirs in the whole world of thought or motion to which sorrow does not vibrate in terrible
if exquisite pulsation” (De Profundis 1067).
From this realization, a new aesthetic through sorrow emerged. The formerly
dedicated sensualist described his own transformation:
I used to live entirely for pleasure. I shunned sorrow and suffering of every kind. I
hated both. I resolved to ignore them as far as possible, to treat them, that is to
say, as modes of imperfection. . .They had no place in my philosophy. . .during
the last few months I have, after terrible struggles and difficulties, been able to
comprehend some of the lessons hidden in the heart of pain. . . .It is really a
revelation. One discerns things that one never discerned before. . . .What one had
felt dimly through instinct, about Art, is intellectually and emotionally realised
with perfect clearness of vision and absolute intensity of apprehension. . . .
Sorrow is the ultimate type both in Life and Art. (De Profundis 1081)
Part of Wilde’s satisfaction in this revelation, as he calls it, is the recognition that “behind
sorrow there is always sorrow. Pain, unlike Pleasure, wears no mask” (De Profundis
1081). Finding absolute honesty in the suffering that unites body and spirit, Wilde also
found a new maxim for a whole life: “Pleasure for the beautiful body, but Pain for the
beautiful soul” (De Profundis 1082). The term Wilde chose to use in describing those
painful experiences was “humility.” The term first appears towards the beginning of the
letter in reference to how Wilde planned to handle his “horrible disgrace. There is only
one thing for me now, absolute Humility” (De Profundis 1074). What Wilde meant by
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the word was not fully explained until later, when he discussed pain and the artist’s life
being one of “self-development. Humility in the artist is his frank acceptance of all
experiences” (1084).
His observations on the influence of suffering and humility led to another change,
this time not in his philosophy of life but in his theory of the imagination. As we saw in
“The Decay of Lying” and The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde’s notion of imaginative
thinking was closely tied to fictional unreality and the preference of the creative medium
over an imitative one (Decay 303). Perhaps “expansion” is a better term for what
happened to Wilde’s theory of imagination, for there is nothing in De Profundis to
suggest that he no longer valued the role imagination played in his original terms. Rather,
for the first time, he came to understand the value of making poverty and suffering the
subject of art. His use of the word “imagination” in De Profundis refers not to the right of
fiction to escape from the doldrums of realism, but to the ability of the artist to
sympathize with the plight of another human being, both personally and through art. He
defines imagination as “’the faculty by which, and by which alone, we can understand
others in their real as in their ideal relations’” (De Profundis 1057). Wilde reproached
Douglas several times for his failure in the realm of personal sympathy—his inability to
imagine Wilde’s situation in prison and Douglas’ resulting heartless abandonment of
Wilde during his prison term (1073). Indeed, it is not only a failing of Douglas’ nature,
but in the nature of an entire class unfamiliar with suffering: “The poor are wiser, more
charitable, more kind, more sensitive than we are. In their eyes prison is a tragedy in a
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man’s life. . . something that calls for sympathy. . . .With people of our rank it is
different. It makes a man a pariah” (De Profundis 1072).
Douglas’ lack of imagination not only rendered him incapable of sympathy, but in
Wilde’s mind it also kept Douglas from “creating” himself as an individual and an
artist—a feat highly valued by Wilde, who remarked: “I am far more of an individualist
than I ever was. Nothing seems to me of the smallest value except what one gets out of
one’s self” (De Profundis1075). Wilde treated Douglas to a discourse on Christ as “the
most supreme of Individualists” (1087). This portrait of Christ, which is also a picture of
the ultimate Romantic hero, is directly linked to Wilde’s expanded definition of
“imagination”:
To the artist, expression is the only mode under which he can conceive life at all.
To him what is dumb is dead. But to Christ it was not so. With a width and
wonder of imagination, that fills one almost with awe, he took the entire world of
the inarticulate, the voiceless world of pain, as his kingdom, and made of himself
its eternal mouthpiece. (De Profundis 1089)
Wilde identified Christ as paragon of individualism in “The Soul of Man under
Socialism”—an individualism realized in the abandonment of society and the pursuit of
perfection through the resulting pain: “Christ made no attempt to reconstruct society and
consequently the Individualism that he preached to man could be realized only through
pain or in solitude” (Soul 286). Wilde’s prison term had provided both pain and solitude,
and this experience impacted his Christology. In De Profundis, Christ is the supreme
individualist because of his ability to empathize, as Wilde implied when he challenged
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Douglas to follow “what Matthew Arnold calls ‘the secret of Jesus’. . .that whatever
happens to another happens to oneself” (De Profundis 1085). Christ created a “whole
conception of Humanity [that] sprang right out of the imagination and can only be
realized by it” (1085). In Wilde’s mind it was Christ’s power of imagination that fueled
his ability to empathize, and it was this same power that made Christ a true
“Individualist”. It is through the study of the gospels that Wilde is convinced of Christ’s
imaginative conception of mankind:
Of late I have been studying the four prose-poems about Christ with some
diligence. . . . And while in reading the Gospels. . .I see this continual assertion of
the imagination as the basis of all spiritual and material life, I see also that to
Christ imagination was simply a form of Love, and that to him Love was Lord in
the fullest meaning of the phrase. . . .Most people live for love and admiration.
But it is by love and admiration that we should live.” (De Profundis 1091-92)
Wilde saw Christ’s teachings as a type of creative fiction—a fiction employing
the skill of lying described in “The Decay of Lying”—because Christ spoke to his
audience as though he was speaking to the people they should be, not to the people they
were. For example, Wilde remarks that Christ was “the first to conceive the divided races
as a unity” (De Profundis 1085). Wilde’s Christ used his imagination to conceive of a
world according to his own paradigm, then taught and interacted with the world as
though that paradigm was reflected in reality. After all, Wilde may have viewed Christ’s
claim to divinity as a metaphor for his own theory of the imagination’s relationship to the
realm of physical experience: “Time and space, succession and extension, are merely
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accidental conditions of Thought. The Imagination can transcend them, and move in a
free sphere of ideal existences” (De Profundis 1119). Wilde’s Christ goes even further
than the unifying of the races—he entirely abolishes the distinction between divinity and
humanity by calling himself both the Son of God and the Son of Man “according to his
mood” (1119). The “idyll[ic]” life and fine morals of Christ are further complimented by
the fine artistry of the tale: “. . .is there anything that for sheer simplicity of pathos
wedded and made one with sublimity of tragic effect can be said to equal or approach
even the last act of Christ’s Passion?” (De Profundis 1086).
In Wilde’s analysis, the “idea of a young Galilean peasant imagining that he could
bear on his own shoulders the burden of the entire world” had a great deal more to do
with Christ creating an image of himself for himself than with any sacrificial gift of his
life (De Profundis 1085). According to Wilde, people only see Christ as an inspirational
figure because Christ was, first and foremost, fully himself. Everything Christ did was for
himself: “To live for others as a definite self-conscious aim was not his creed. It was not
the basis of his creed. When he says ‘Forgive your enemies,’ it is not for the sake of the
enemy but for one’s own sake that he says so. . . ” (De Profundis 1088). This living
according to what is necessary and best for oneself is tempered by the imagination that
teaches the ultimate sameness of every human experience. In fact, the individualist is
realized through imaginative empathy and the recognition of the commonness and
universality of human experience—it is this idea that gives mankind what Wilde calls a
“Titan personality” (De Profundis 1089). Christ’s perfect execution of this philosophy of
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life makes him both Wilde’s supreme individualist and supreme artist. Christ’s art is the
incarnation, a work of art which Wilde declares is Christ himself:
And feeling with the artistic nature of one to whom Sorrow and Suffering were
modes through which he could realise his conception of the Beautiful, that an idea
is of no value till it becomes incarnate and is made an image, he makes himself
the image of the Man of Sorrows, and as such has fascinated and dominated Art
as no Greek god ever succeeded in doing. (De Profundis 1089)
By creating himself according to his own ideals and experience Wilde’s Christ achieved
the kind of everlasting fame sought by Achilles and Beowulf, but it is an immortality
achieved through life rather than death. Because Christ is so often artistically represented
dying by wrongful execution, and not dying the glorious death of a warrior, those images
of Christ elicit the empathy that both acknowledges Christ the wronged individualist and
expands the “Titan personality” of the viewer (De Profundis 1089). In this way, empathy
strengthens and diversifies the individualist.
Some may detect in Wilde’s admiration of Christ as artistic individualist a subtle
note of camaraderie—for example, when Wilde says: “out of his own imagination
entirely did Jesus of Nazareth create himself” (De Profundis 1091). Wilde certainly sees
himself as a Christ-like figure both in terms of self-realization as a work of art,
imaginative creativity, and suffering. The similarities even continue into the realm of
rules and laws. At the beginning of De Profundis, Wilde writes: “I am a born
antinomian. I am one of those who are made for exceptions, not for laws” (1076). Later,
Wilde describes Christ: “For him there were no laws: there were exceptions merely” (De
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Profundis 1093). While we can never really know whether Wilde reinterpreted himself
through the character of Christ or interpreted Christ in light of his own self-perception,
we can see that while De Profundis’ account of Christ began as an analysis of the
character in Wilde’s reading, it ends as a comparison study—perhaps Wilde was not
exempt from his own belief that people will always see themselves in a work of art.
Wilde’s interpretation of Christ becomes of supreme interest when reading his
final published work The Ballad of Reading Gaol. Back in 1891 in “The Decay of Lying”
Wilde had written that Charles Reade (1814-1884), former Dean of Arts at Magdalen,
had wasted “his life in a foolish attempt to . . . draw public attention to the state of our
convict prisons” (300). His argument against Reade’s choice of subject matter was a
reflection of Wilde’s belief that the cold, hard truth was not a topic conducive to the
production of creative fiction. Wilde’s personal experience compelled him yet again to
make an adjustment in his views. As displayed through his essay “The Soul of Man
Under Socialism,” Wilde saw society as a whole responsible for the state of man. This
idea gripped Wilde during his prison term. After his release from Reading Gaol on May
19, 1897, he set about writing The Ballad of Reading Gaol, the poem that was to be his
only completed work post-incarceration. It was, I believe, designed to express through
poetry what Wilde had written to Douglas in prose in De Profundis:
Society takes upon itself the right to inflict appalling punishments on the
individual, but it also has the supreme vice of shallowness, and fails to realise
what it has done. When the man’s punishment is over, it leaves him to himself:
that is to say it abandons him at the very moment when its highest duty towards
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him begins. It is really ashamed of its own actions, and shuns those whom it has
punished, as people shun a creditor whose debt they cannon pay, or one on whom
they have inflicted an irreparable, an irredeemable wrong. (De Profundis 1078)
If there was any chance that Victorian society did not realize the effect prison had on its
occupants, Wilde was determined to enlighten them. With The Ballad of Reading Gaol,
the author so often suspected of being disingenuous unmasked his convictions in no
uncertain terms.
In 1897, a year after his release, The Ballad of Reading Gaol was published
identifying “C.3.3” as the author—using Wilde’s cell-block number to hide his identity.
Long before his own prison experience Wilde had remarked of his contemporary Wilfred
Scawen Blunt: “It must be admitted that by sending Mr Blunt to gaol he [Mr Balfour, the
magistrate] has converted a clever rhymer into an earnest and deep-thinking poet” (qtd. in
Kohl 290). There are many who would arrive at the same conclusion concerning Wilde.
Speaking of The Ballad of Reading Gaol in a letter to Leonard Smithers, his publisher,
Wilde “confessed that the ‘subject is all wrong and [the] treatment too personal’—by
which he meant ‘too autobiographical’” (Beckson 243). In hopes that life would take its
cue from art, Wilde takes life as his subject: the poem begins as an account of a hanging,
but ends a treatise on the responsibility of society for its fellow human beings.
The Ballad of Reading Gaol poetically records the execution of Charles Thomas
Wooldridge, who was convicted of murdering his wife—according to Ellmann,
Wooldridge had “slit [her] throat with a razor” (90). In Wilde’s poetic account, the entire
inmate population was distressed by the company of a man they knew was condemned to
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death and the hanging that eventually removed him from their company. Wilde describes
the apparent calm resignation of the condemned man, and the fear in the hearts of the
other inmates who watched him as they took their daily hour of exercise:
So with curious eyes and sick surmise
We watched him day by day
And wondered if each one of us
Would end the self-same way
For none can tell to what red Hell
His sightless soul may stray.” (Ballad 249)
Wooldridge is put on suicide watch “lest himself should rob / Their scaffold of its prey”
(250), but Wilde’s concern eventually comes to focus upon the effect on free individuals
of condemning a man to death and then resolutely watching him die. Even the guards are
described as discomfited into a stony silence when in the presence of the condemned
man:
For he to whom a watcher’s doom
Is given as his task,
Must set upon his lips,
and make his face a mask.
Or else he might be moved, and try
To comfort and console:
And what should human Pity do
Pent up in Murderer’s Hole?
What word of grace in such a place
Could help a brother’s soul? (Ballad 250)
A large part of Wilde’s grief and outrage over this situation centers not so much
on the issue of execution in relation to the victim but on the ability of people to rejoice in
the execution of another human being, and to imprison their fellows in such morbid
conditions. Through the poem, Wilde draws a direct connection between the executed
murderer and a society of murderers when he writes of the condemned man and those
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who watched him die: “He had but killed a thing that lived, / Whilst they had killed the
dead” (Ballad 257). As he tells us, it is not only those condemned to die who succumb to
death:
Each narrow cell in which we dwell
Is a foul and dark latrine,
And the fetid breath of living Death
Chokes up each grated screen,
And all, but Lust, is turned to dust
In Humanity’s machine. (Ballad 262)
Instead of a natural and timely death reducing men (as well as women and children) to
the dust from which they came, it is the relentless “machine” of man and his crushing
tools of so-called justice that convert living souls to dry powder. The use of the word
“dust” brings to mind the origins of man according to Genesis 3:19: “for out of it [the
ground] wast thou taken; For dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return”. This is a
statement made while God curses “our grand parents,” as Milton calls Adam and Eve, for
the first commission of sin (Milton 354). Shakespeare also used “dust” in description of
the dead—for example, when Queen Gertrude tells her mourning son “do not…seek for
thy noble father in the dust” (Shakespeare 1192), or when Hamlet wonders:
What [a] piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in
form and moving, how express and admirable in action, how like an angel in
apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world; the paragon of animals;
and yet to me what is this quintessence of dust? (Shakespeare 1204)
We can almost hear Wilde finish Hamlet’s speech: “Man delights not me” (Shakespeare
1204). But Wilde must appeal to humankind as he never has before, for, like Hamlet,
Wilde cannot accept the tyranny of a fixed fate, and rather than spending any time
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shouting out “who’s there” to the darkness, Wilde addresses his thinly veiled malediction
to those who are unquestionably present. It is death and dust, the physicality of man’s
existence that ultimately unifies human experience. Thus, in Wilde’s mind, regardless of
an ultimate being or fate in the universe, responsibility for the state of all mankind must
lie most immediately in the hands of other men. This is why the model of Christ the
imaginative, empathetic individualist of Wilde’s De Profundis is so important—in
Wilde’s opinion it is men fashioned after Christ’s representation who would be able and
willing to defy society in defense of prisoners, their suffering fellow men.
This idea is fully consistent with what we know about Wilde’s stance on the
tension between authority and progress. Richard Ellmann took a quote from one of
Wilde’s university commonplace books in which Wilde writes: “Progress in thought is
the assertion of the individual against authority” (42). Only those individuals able to
separate themselves from the fear of authority, or even from the established forms, will
be able to assist in the advance of society as a whole. In Wilde’s view of human nature,
the evolution of society must occur through the widespread progress of individuals—the
macrocosm of society evolves through the progress of the microcosm of the individual.
Wilde sees the evil in each individual’s experience as the result of the oppression or
neglect of the crowd: the proprietor of established forms. Thus, Wilde believed that
when one person committed a murder, and when a small group of people carried out an
execution, society as a collective of individuals was responsible. In Wilde’s own words
“[t]he evolution of man is slow. The injustice of man is great” (Soul 289).
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Wilde had examined the universality of human experience and social evolution
through individual rebellion in critical form before his incarceration, but in The Ballad of
Reading Gaol, he presents the same ideas through art. Finding himself no longer looking
down on the plight of the world and lecturing as one only limitedly affected by its state,
in his prison cell a cry is wrenched out of him, the only response he can offer, as one who
now witnesses and fears physical destruction. Wilde’s poem cries out for a scheme, for a
new social order—one that will forsake such a pitiless “morality.” Wilde included hope
in “The Soul of Man Under Socialism,” and it carries over, although unmentioned, into
The Ballad of Reading Gaol. Wilde’s hope is found in the proclamation that the cure for
humanity’s ills is not dependent upon anything but itself: there is something that can be
done. According to Wilde, there is a “better way” that man can realize on his own.
Not by chance does he choose the language of religion. As the primary text of
Christianity—the formally embraced religion of Britain during the Victorian Age—and
the source of the Gospels he mentioned dwelling upon in De Profundis, the Bible made
the care of one person for another the most important of all commandments. For any
Victorian familiar with the Gospels, Wilde’s frequent allusions to Christ, his disciples,
betrayal, and martyrdom would have done much more than compare any person in the
prison to Christ. It would have raised up memories of the biblical parables and the
teachings of Jesus, who went so far as to say that whenever a person fed the hungry,
clothed the naked, housed the stranger, or visited the prisoner out of love for Jesus, it
would be the same as doing those things for Christ himself (Matt. 25: 35-45). By using
the language of professing Christians to explore the ideals of a progressing society Wilde
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shows that, regardless of ideology, the action to be taken is the same: mankind as a whole
must care for itself through the concern of one individual for another.
Of course, the two-fold interpretation in this chapter only became possible after
Wilde’s death. Although Wilde wrote De Profundis before The Ballad of Reading Gaol,
De Profundis was not published until 1909, nine years after his death. This means that for
almost twelve years Wilde’s friend Robert Ross, to whom Wilde had entrusted De
Profundis, was the only person who had access to Wilde’s personal Christology. With
only an uninformed reading of Reading Gaol it is possible to suppose that there was some
great reformation in Wilde’s aesthetic and religious philosophy. But that simply is not so.
As we have already seen from his interpretation of the Christ figure in De Profundis,
Wilde was using the name Christ, but he had a very non-traditional character in his own
mind. In Reading Gaol, the blood of Christ is no longer a metaphor for the spiritual
cleansing that unites man with God, but for the cleansing of wrongs that separate men
from one another. Take for example Wilde’s description of the society and individuals
responsible for the execution of Charles Thomas Wooldridge:
And with tears of blood he cleansed the hand,
the hand that held the steel:
For only blood can wipe out blood,
And only tears can heal:
And crimson stain that was of Cain
Became Christ’s snow-white seal.” (Ballad 264)
There is no hierarchical relationship here, only a concern for the necessary equality of
persons and consequences—here, it is specifically the impartial justice of blood for
blood, mirroring the blood of Christ shed, according to Christ, to save the lives of men.
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Of course, “Christ’s snow white seal” has nothing to do with the Lutheran stamp
of salvific purity that is transferred from Christ to sinners—a process called
“justification”. Distinguished Professor of Theology Millard Erickson describes
justification as the process by which men are “declared to have fulfilled all that God’s
law requires. . . . Historically, it was this issue that preoccupied Martin Luther and led to
his break from the Roman Catholic Church” (Erickson 968). Wilde’s legendary and
previously mentioned contemporary, C. H. Spurgeon, preached on this idea to the
thousands of Victorians who flocked to London’s Metropolitan Tabernacle on Sunday
mornings. The many quotes from Spurgeon’s writings compiled by Tom Carter include
several on the importance Spurgeon assigned to justification—one such reads: The
doctrine of justification by faith through the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ is. . . .the
very salt of the gospel. It is impossible to bring it forward too often. . . .It is the
foundation doctrine of the gospel of Jesus Christ” (Carter 116). The term and theology of
“justification” was well known and highly controversial in the various denominations of
Victorian Christianity. It is the idea of a judge declaring a man free from guilt in the eyes
of the law—in the case of Christian justification it is divine law. But Wilde replaced the
notion of the justification of man with divine law. Wilde’s ideal is an affirmation of
Christ as the perfect individualist, who set the example for humanity,
so that at the present moment all who come in contact with his personality, even
though they may neither bow to his altar nor kneel before his priest, yet somehow
find that the ugliness of their sins is taken away and the beauty of their sorrow
revealed to them. (De Profundis 1085)
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Wilde’s Christ is concerned with the justification of a man to himself—instead of being
seen as righteous in the eyes of God by following a seemingly arbitrary set of rules—
Wilde is suggesting that men treat their fellows in such a way that they can declare one
another righteous. The standard of that righteousness is the same standard that Wilde sees
in Christ: the application of empathy and the action that it demands. This is yet another
example of progress through the individual and through the individual’s recognition that
what happens to one person happens to all, as Wilde described in De Profundis.
But justification is not the only idea taken from Christian theology and redefined
by Wilde; sin and salvation are transformed as well. For example, Wilde writes:
Ah! Happy they whose hearts can break
And peace of pardon win!
How else may man make straight his plan
And cleanse his soul from sin?
How else but through a broken heart
May Lord Christ enter in? (Ballad 264)
The theological notion of sin traditionally centers on its separating properties: sin is that
which separates man from the Creator because it is an act of rebellion. In effect, it is the
idea that man was designed to do one thing a certain way and has instead decided to
ignore that purpose and follow his own inclinations. Before the beginning of his prison
experience, Wilde’s definition of sin was comparable to his definition of crime—simply
an act that went against socially acceptable behavior. As in Dorian Gray, sin was
predominantly linked to individual desire and its relationship to the framework of a
moralizing society. In the context of Reading Gaol, that definition has almost inverted.
Instead of encompassing only those who flout society, “sin” in Reading Gaol applied to
society as a conglomerate guilty of the same crimes. The sin committed by society was
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not just the sin of condemning its fellow men to live out prison sentences in squalor
before gladly depositing them at the poorhouse to be forgotten. Each member of society
has sinned by failing to follow Christ in fostering a sense of imaginative sympathy.
Through his use of the name of Christ in The Ballad of Reading Gaol, Wilde uses
the professed values of Victorian society’s moralists to rebuke them. Somehow the
moralism of the Victorians had resulted in a society that appeared to place little value
upon compassion. But for Wilde’s Christ, as he pointed out in De Profundis, it is “by
love. . .that we should live,” not by laws (1092). In fact, in the Bible the rewards of
heaven and the punishments of hell are often framed in terms of love and hatred towards
others. The laws of the God of the Bible were intended to be obeyed out of love and with
love, as the apostle John recorded: “If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is
a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom
he hath not seen?” (I John 4:20).
And that’s just what The Ballad of Reading Gaol was: an act of love. Wilde’s
experience in prison had perfected his own sense of “imaginative sympathy” (De
Profundis 1085). Within a few days of his release he wrote a letter to the Daily Chronicle
“deploring the cruelty to imprisoned children at Reading Gaol” (qtd. in Beckson 262). He
wrote another letter, the following year, describing the horrors of prison life and the
indifferent injustice of the prison system. But The Ballad of Reading Gaol is his magnum
opus. In The Ballad of Reading Gaol, he is not concerned with wit, clever verbiage, a
defense of aestheticism, or even religion; he wants results. He demands action, a demand
that flies in the face of the seemingly complacent and theory-oriented Wilde of the days
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before his incarceration. No longer able to remain removed from the lives of his less
fortunate fellow men by the now irrelevant barriers of birth, wealth, education, and taste,
Wilde’s Reading Gaol analyzes the state of society with a new sense of urgency.
When Wilde described the condemned men of Reading Gaol, it was not to tell a
pathetic story—for that would have been simple mimesis and a waste of artistic ambition.
No, Wilde’s goal was to make each individual member of his audience choose a side.
They could count themselves with Judas and Caiaphas, who with a kiss approved of the
evil done to another, or they could count themselves with Christ, Wilde, and the
individualists—the lovers of men. But before a reader could count oneself among the
Judas’ or the Christ’s, one would have to identify one’s current position. Wilde throws
down this challenge by saying:
And all men kill the thing they love,
By all let this be heard,
Some do it with a bitter look,
Some with a flattering word,
The coward does it with a kiss,
The brave man with a sword! (Ballad 265)
This, the final stanza of The Ballad of Reading Gaol, separates Wilde’s readers into two
categories: those who passively condone the abuse of their fellow men, and those who
actively participate in sustaining the survival of an abusive justice system guided by a
rigid and uncompassionate moralism. Wilde hoped for an option beyond the
contemporary definitions of moral and immoral and for a system of social discipline with
resources beyond torturous imprisonment and execution. This is why he created a model
for those who would escape those oppositions—the model of “the spirit of the Christ who
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is not in Churches” (De Profundis 1097) by showing that his Christ’s “morality is all
sympathy, just what morality should be” (1093).
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Of course, as mentioned earlier, Wilde’s audience did not have access to his
Christological and moral manual, De Profundis, until eleven years after Reading Gaol
was published. The popularity of The Ballad of Reading Gaol is therefore a testimony to
Wilde’s successful creation of a work of art that both reflected his own perspective and
was accessible to his readers. According to Richard Ellmann, The Ballad of Reading
Gaol sold “as no poem had sold for years,” selling over eighteen hundred copies in the
first month. Thousands of more copies were printed between the first release in February
1899 and the seventh printing in June (Ellmann 559). While the reviews of The Picture of
Dorian Gray had centered almost entirely upon the moral nature of the work, reviews of
Reading Gaol focused primarily upon the artistic quality and moving nature of the piece.
The perceived ambiguity of Wilde’s moral sense in Dorian Gray had eclipsed the more
important questions he was addressing there. Because Reading Gaol used familiar
allusions and was anonymous, the readers were able to focus upon the message of the
poem, rather than the plot. This is the literary realization of the mask Wilde had tried so
hard to create with his life, the mask of insincerity that deflected his audience from taking
his true opinions seriously.
This same tactic appeared differently in Wilde’s attempts at literary mask-making.
For him, I believe, a literary mask is a device that effectively communicates concerns or
interests to the reader without explicitly revealing the author’s position on the issue.
Dorian Gray was a tool for provoking thought, but it failed to be a successful mask for
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Wilde’s interests because the readers could not see beyond the immoral actions in the
plot—whether those actions were interpreted as an encouragement toward or a warning
against immorality. The novel failed to inspire a new way of thinking. In fact, it failed
even to that part of its purpose apparent to readers. This was the result of the disconnect
between Wilde and the practical outcome of the issues he was addressing. In The Picture
of Dorian Gray the issues of aestheticism and moralism seem to be largely ideological—
important but not urgent. Wilde’s experiences in prison inspire a sense of crisis that is
expressed through the impassioned language and the undeniable clarity of The Ballad of
Reading Gaol. The primary difference between Dorian Gray and Reading Gaol, as far as
how they were understood in their time, is simply the fact that, whether by design or
happy accident, Reading Gaol employed terms and imagery that could be interpreted
favorably by a moralistic public while, at the same time, harboring an entirely private
meaning for Wilde. This is a successful literary mask. Reading Gaol was not only the
incarnation of Wilde’s thoughts and theories, but it was also a clear and effective
message to the readers. They did not have to agree with his personal vision of Christ to
understand what Wilde was saying about the inhumanity of prisons and the responsibility
of one human being to another.
Wilde’s ability to express his own ideas while keeping the overall message
accessible to his audience reflects a leap in his maturity as an artist and as a thinker. In
many ways Dorian Gray illustrated the immoral but did not provide a definition for the
moral. Reading Gaol provided both—a portrait of the immorality of man and a vision of
the morality of compassion. It was Wilde’s personal experience that imbued him with a
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sense of the importance of The Ballad of Reading Gaol and with the absolute necessity
for a change in the prison environment he described. When Wilde was in prison writing
De Profundis he expressed the desire that “there may come into my art also, no less than
into my life, a still deeper note, one of greater unity and passion, and directness of
impulse. Not width but intensity is the true aim of modern art” (De Profundis 1098).
Wilde realized that hope in The Ballad of Reading Gaol, proving that the deepening of an
artistic nature and the confirmation of imaginative sympathy through experience is the
surest way to instill a work of art with an intense and specific sense of purpose.
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